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INTRODUCTION
Over the years, a substantial number of people have heard a
knock on the door accompanied by the ominous announcement of
police authority to enter and search. A small but recently growing
number of those searches have been conducted under the authority
of "anticipatory search warrants."' Unfortunately, the term "an-
ticipatory search warrant" sounds like a shorthand phrase for a
constitutional violation.
An anticipatory search warrant generally is a warrant condi-
tioning a search on an event that is to occur after issuance of the
warrant. 2 For example, an anticipatory search warrant may be
issued for narcotics at a specified premises with execution of the
warrant conditioned on a future controlled delivery of narcotics to
that place. The anticipated event may be, but need not be, a
prerequisite to probable cause to search.
The immediate concerns raised by use of anticipatory warrants
are the following: (1) whether the warrant can ever satisfy the
fourth amendment requirement that "no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause"; (2) if not per se invalid under the fourth
amendment, what information will be required to establish validity;
(3) what discretion is given to the executing police officer to deter-
mine whether the condition creating the probable cause or right to
execute the warrant has occurred; (4) what are appropriate limits
on the scope of the search; and (5) whether the good faith exception
will apply to issuance or execution of an invalid anticipatory war-
rant. An additional issue, considering the purposes of an antici-
I See United States v. Weber, 915 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Peden,
891 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989); United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d
1195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1639 (1989); United States
v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1987); United States v. Moore, 742 F Supp. 727 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Rivera v. United
States, 728 F Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Musgrave, 726 F Supp. 1027
(W.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Zygarowskx, 724 F Supp. 1052 (D. Mass. 1989); United
States v. Boffardi, 684 F Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1988);
United States v. Flippen, 674 F Supp. 536 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 266 (4th Cir.
1988) (no opinion); State v. Wright, 772 P.2d 250 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); Commonwealth
v. Cast, 556 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v. Reviera, 563 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989); McNeill v. Commonwealth, 395 S.E.2d 460 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
2 For a discussion of definitions, see infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
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patory search warrant together with the realities of drug trafficking,
is whether the warrant must always specify a particular place to
be searched.
This Article defines anticipatory warrants through a discussion
of the numerous scenarios in which warrants have been labeled
anticipatory.3 The Article then focuses on the validity of anticipa-
tory warrants by analyzing Supreme Court precedent that appears
to approve the concept and by reviewing recent amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that acknowledge at least the
limited validity of anticipatory warrants. 4 Assuming there are no
constitutional or statutory prohibitions against anticipatory war-
rants, this Article examines the validity of anticipatory warrants as
currently issued.5 The validity evaluation includes the purposes of
anticipatory warrants and available alternatives in various cases, as
well as the appropnate quantum of information necessary to es-
tablish probable cause in those situations. Additionally, assuming
an anticipatory warrant has been invalidly issued in a particular
case, the Article discusses the need for careful application of the
good faith exception to protect judicial decisions but not to prevent
review of discretionary decisions of police.6 Finally, the Article
demonstrates that appropriately limited anticipatory warrants sup-
port fourth amendment policy goals as long as there are guidelines
to limit police discretion as to time, place, and scope of the search.7
The availability of anticipatory warrants may serve to limit gov-
ernmental opportunity to rely on non-warrant exceptions to the
fourth amendment.
I. DEFINITION OF AN ANTICIPATORY WARRANT
Courts have labeled search warrants as anticipatory in a variety
of fact situations. Some cases state that an anticipatory warrant
"is a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that
at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime
will be located at a specified place." 8 That definition can be
I See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 23-75 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 76-126 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
I State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (quoting 2 W
LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.7(c) at 94 (2d ed. 1987)); see United States v. Garcia,
882 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1989); see also United States v. McGriff, 678 F Supp. 1010,
1014 at n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
interpreted to limit anticipatory search warrants to situations where
there is no probable cause to search independent of the anticipated
event. Both probable cause that the specified seizable evidence will
be on the premises to be searched and execution of the search
warrant are theoretically contingent upon the occurrence of a future
event.
Alternatively, it also can be argued that this definition requires
only a showing of probable cause that a specified item will be
present on the premuses in the future. This interpretation does not
necessarily preclude, at issuance, the existence of probable cause
that other seizable evidence is currently on the premises to be
searched and thus does not necessarily require the occurrence of
the future event to justify execution of the warrant. Neither inter-
pretation, however, fully defines the situations in which warrants
have been labeled anticipatory
The future event in the context of anticipatory warrants is
almost always some type of delivery of contraband or other seizable
evidence to the prermses listed in the warrant. For example, assume
government agents validly intercept a shipment of cocaine ad-
dressed to a specific person at a specific location. Agents may then
arrange a so-called "controlled delivery" 9 to the addressee. In one
form of controlled delivery, government agents dressed as postal
employees hand deliver the shipment to the addressee.10 If the
affidavit in support of a search warrant for the address on the
package indicates that government agents will make a controlled
delivery, then the magistrate may conclude, prior to delivery, that
upon delivery there will be probable cause to believe that there is
seizable evidence at the specified address. On that basis, the mag-
istrate may issue a search warrant whose probable cause and exe-
cution are conditioned upon the anticipatory future event, i.e.,
delivery."l Between issuance of the warrant and its execution, the
9 For a discussion of deliveries, see infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
,0 This fact scenario is like that found in McGriff, 678 F Supp. at 1010.
" In some situations, the acceptance of a delivery may be a necessary element of an
offense. Acceptance of the delivery gives probable cause as to an offense and probable
cause that evidence of the offense is now on the premises. One example is knowing receipt
through the mail of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. See
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1990). Until the defendant receives the matenal, no
crime has been committed. Once there is receipt, however, the crime has been committed
and the delivered material is evidence of the offense. United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d
1195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1639 (1988).
[VOL. 79
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executing officer need not return to the issuing magistrate to advise
the magistrate that the conditional event has occurred.' 2
In the example above, government agents had no information
about the addressee or the address of the shipment other than that
provided by the shipment itself. Frequently, however, agents sus-
pect,13 or may already have probable cause to believe, that the
addressee is engaged in criminal activity or that the address is being
used to facilitate or conceal criminal activity In those situations,
the valid interception of a shipment of contraband addressed to a
suspect, or suspect address, may give agents probable cause inde-
pendent of any future event to search immediately for other evi-
dence.14 The future event (delivery of contraband) is not the genesis
of probable cause to search for the other evidence. Instead, a
judicially imposed delivery requirement prior to execution of the
warrant makes that future event serve merely as the triggering
mechanism that permits execution of the warrant to search both
for the recently delivered contraband and other evidence relating
to the suspected offense. 5 Warrants that require the occurrence of
the future event to establish probable cause as well as warrants
that merely use the future event to trigger execution have been
labeled anticipatory 16
12 United States v. Segovia, 800 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1986) (states that after issuance
of an anticipatory warrant to be executed within one hour of the anticipated (uncontrolled)
delivery, "law enforcement officers need report back new or correcting information only
when that information is material to the magistrate's determination of probable cause").
In United States v. Moore, 742 F Supp. 727, 736 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), failure to maintain
observation of the container to be delivered, under circumstances suggesting that a confed-
erate of defendant was aware of police surveillance, was a material change of circumstances
that had to be reported to the magistrate.
"1 See United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988) (various investigatory
means used to identify defendant as an appropriate target of an operation to discover the
names of persons receiving child pornography through the mail).
4 See Moore, 742 F Supp. at 733 (The court ruled that the warrant could be divided
into two parts: an anticipatory aspect relating to the future delivery, and a non-anticipatory
aspect relating to evidence expected to be on the premises independent of the future
delivery.).
15 Merely because police have probable cause to search does not mean the search must
take place at the earliest possible moment. Even after issuance of a search warrant, police
may execute within the statutorily defimed time period, commonly 10 days, as long as
probable cause continues to exist. See W LAFAvE, supra note 8, at § 4.7. Police have
discretion to execute an authorized search at a time most likely to produce the evidence
sought.
16 See United States v. Peden, 891 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1989). In Peden, based on
extensive past information concerning defendant and information concermng pedophiles
and persons receiving materials detailing the sexual exploitation of children, the court found
that agents had probable cause for an extensive search of defendant's premises for circum-
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A third common situation-a hybrid of the first two-occurs
in prosecutions for receipt of child pornography through the mail.
There may be probable cause to believe that there is already seizable
non-contraband evidence on the premises at the time the warrant
is issued but there is no crime or basis to enter the premises until
future delivery of the child pornography Delivery is the basis for
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and for
the search of the premises.
A defimtion of an anticipatory warrant arguably broader than
that presented by LaFave 7 and more readily fitting the variety of
anticipatory warrant cases was utilized in United States v. Garcia:
"An anticipatory warrant, by definition, is a warrant that has been
issued before the necessary events have occurred which will allow
a constitutional search of the premises; if those events do not
transpire, the warrant is void." 18 The definition in Garcia is not
based on the premise that the government lacks probable cause
unless the future event occurs. Rather, it prohibits the intrusion
until a specified future event occurs.
II. CONCEPTUAL VALIDITY oF ANTICIPATORY WARRANTS
Under the Garcia definition, there are two general forms of
anticipatory search warrants. One form requires the occurrence of
stantial evidence of the anticipated offense. However, a controlled delivery of sexually
explicit matenal involving minors was the required trigger for the search. Id., see also
Garcia, 882 F.2d at 704 (In evaluating the scope of a search pursuant to an anticipatory
warrant, the court noted that "[h]ere, however, additional facts in the supporting affidavit
gave nse to probable cause that the apartment was being used as a storage and distribution
center for drugs."); United States v. Boffardi, 684 F Supp. 1263, 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(defendant had been identified as a consumer of hardcore child pornography prior to a
controlled delivery); Gutman, 670 P.2d at 1169 (search conditioned on a future event,
although prior to issuance of the warrant there was probable cause to believe defendant
was involved in illicit drug activity and that the premises were used for illicit drug distri-
bution).
Note that varying degrees of certainty of delivery may have an impact on whether the
warrant should be either issued or executed. See infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
17 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11 882 F.2d at 702; see also Moore, 742 F Supp. at 733 ("[T]he warrant was
anticipatory insofar as it sought to recover the two packages which were to be delivered to
the defendant's residence. However, insofar as the warrant sought records or documents
related to the delivery of the two packages it was not contingent upon the delivery of the
packages and was therefore, in that aspect, non-anticipatory."); Commonwealth v. Reviera,
563 A.2d 1252, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (Although the warrant as issued was not
contingent upon any future event, the court reviewed the warrant as if it were anticipatory
because it was issued shortly before an anticipated delivery and execution was unlikely until
after the delivery.). But see Rivera v. United States, 728 F Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(suggesting that a warrant requested and issued on the day of the anticipated event is not
properly categorized as an anticipatory warrant).
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a future event to establish probable cause for the search. The other
form requires the future event as a precondition to the search but
not as a precondition to probable cause. Both forms require a
specified future event prior to execution of the warrant.
Recent cases are virtually unammous in holding that anticipa-
tory search warrants are not invalid per se under the fourth amend-
ment. 19 As is discussed in this section, the language of the fourth
amendment does not preclude anticipatory warrants, and Supreme
Court opimons and anticipatory elements of conventional warrants
support the validity of anticipatory search warrants. Further, recent
amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and the
purposes served by such warrants suggest Supreme Court approval
of anticipatory warrants.
A. Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment states that "no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause."' 2 Defendants have argued that the
19 United States v. Weber, 915 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Peden, 891
F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33
(4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Washington, 852 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 612 (1988); United States v. Segovia, 800 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1986); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829
(1986); United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lowe, 575
F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 869 (1978); United States v. Outland, 476
F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Rivera, 728 F Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Musgrave, 726
F Supp. 1027 (W.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Zygarowski, 724 F Supp. 1052 (D. Mass.
1989); United States v. Boffardi, 684 F Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v.
McGriff, 678 F Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Feldman, 366 F Supp. 356
(D. Haw. 1973); State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Alvidres v.
Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Commonwealth v. Soares, 424
N.E.2d 221 (Mass. 1981); People v. Glen, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, 282 N.E.2d 614 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Reviera, 563 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); McNeil v. Common-
wealth, 395 S.E.2d 460 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); see United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985) (invalidating an anticipatory warrant
because of insufficient connection between the delivery and the premises to be searched);
United States v. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964) (invalidating warrant because no crime
was alleged that would justify a search); State v. Wright, 772 P.2d 250 (Idaho Ct. App.
1989); State v. Coker, 746 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
Contra United States v. Flippen, 674 F Supp. 536 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 266
(4th Cir. 1988) (no opimon) (although anticipatory drug warrants might be valid, such
warrants invalid when searching for child pornography); United States v. Roberts, 333 F
Supp. 786, 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1971) ("A search warrant will not issue upon any affidavit
reciting only the anticipation of a future offense."); United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d
1351 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974) (anticipatory warrant was invalid
but no appeal was taken on that issue).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
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fourth amendment requires probable cause that the suspect item is
currently on the premises to be searched. 2 Rejecting this interpre-
tation, courts suggest that the fourth amendment does not neces-
sadly require that all of the events generating the probable cause
already have occurred at the time the warrant is issued. 22 The
primary goals of the warrant process are to interpose a neutral and
detached judicial officer between potentially overzealous govern-
ment agents and the private citizen and to ensure that the agents
who invade an individual's privacy do so only when probable cause
exists at the time of the intrusion. Merely because the "fact"
justifying the intrusion has not occurred when the warrant is issued
does not affect the magistrate's decision-making process in consid-
ering the likelihood that the "fact" will occur and that probable
cause will exist at the time of the warrant's execution. In that
context, a probable cause determination is made when the warrant
is issued.
B. Supreme Court Opinions
Although there are numerous lower court opimons, the United
States Supreme Court has not directly considered the validity of
anticipatory search warrants. The Court has approved an arguably
21 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) (States that probable cause exists
"where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed."). Relying
on the "has been or is being committed" language from Berger, the defendant in Skaff,
418 F.2d at 430, challenged the validity of an anticipatory warrant. The court rejected the
challenge asserting that the primary problem to be avoided was a premature search, one
occurrng before the commission of the cnme alleged or possession of the goods to be
seized. Where there is no danger that the property seized is any other than that for which
the search is authorized, there is sufficient judicial control of the search to satisfy the fourth
amendment.
= Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702 ("Thus, the fact that the contraband is not 'presently
located at the place described in the warrant' is immaterial, so long as 'there is probable
cause to believe that it will be there when the search warrant is executed."'); Washington,
852 F.2d at 804 ("Appellant's argument that there was no probable cause to issue the
warrant because, at the time the warrant was signed, there was no evidence that the heroin
was on the premises or that the controlled delivery would actually succeed, is unpersuasive.
'When evidence . is on a sure course to its destination, as in the mail, the prior issuance
of a warrant is permissible."'); Goff, 681 F.2d at 1240 ("Our concern is that probable
cause exist at the time of the search."); Lowe, 575 F.2d at 1194 ("Contraband does not
have to be presently located at the place described in the warrant if there is probable cause




analogous concept. In Draper v United States,3 an arrest case,
police had information from a reliable informant predicting Dra-
per's future conduct. The informant described Draper in detail,
including the clothing he would be wearing as well as the type and
color of bag he would be carrying when he arrived in Denver by
train on one of two days. The informant also predicted that Draper
would be walking fast and carrying heroin.
Officers waited at the train station on the two designated days.
On the second day they observed an individual matching the in-
formant's description and verified the details of the predicted fu-
ture conduct. The officers, however, never observed any illegal
activity Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the officers could arrest
Draper because verification of most of the informant's statements
constituted probable cause that the reported criminal activity also
was taking place. The occurrence and verification of previously
anticipated conduct supplied probable cause to make an arrest. 24
Further, the Court relied on the officers' after-the-fact testimony
that the conditions precedent to probable cause (verification of the
informer's information) had occurred. The officers had some dis-
cretion to determine if a sufficient quantity of the anticipated
events had been verified.
Although Draper specifically addressed probable cause to ar-
rest, the underlying concern was a search issue. Until Draper was
searched incident to his arrest, police had no evidence that Draper
was violating the law Unlike many other arrests where there is
independent information about criminal involvement, prosecution
of Draper depended entirely on the results of the search incident
to arrest. In effect, the police were determinng probable cause to
search.
Nevertheless, Draper left unclear whether the Court would have
validated a warrant to search or arrest Draper if the warrant had
been issued prior to his arrest and was conditioned on the verifi-
cation of the future events. The issue then would not be the
existence of probable cause after verification but whether police
could get a warrant conditioned on verification. In Spinelli v
United States, the Court indicated in dicta that in the Draper
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
2 Although public arrests without a warrant are generally permissible, United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), reliance on police officers to deternmne if conditions
necessary to arrest have occurred is much the same as allowing an officer with an antici-
patory warrant to determine if the tnggenng event has occurred.
1990-91]
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situation it would have validated the issuance of an arrest warrant
prior to verification.21
Such a warrant clearly would have been anticipatory since the
police did not know which individual to arrest until they observed
a future event, a person arriving by train on a specific mormng,
who matched the description given by the informer. The police
were the final arbiters of whether the condition (matching descrip-
tion and conduct) triggering probable cause and execution was
sufficiently demonstrated.
In Draper, a conditional arrest or search warrant would have
satisfied one of the purposes of the warrant process. Prior to
intrusion by police, the officers could have given the relevant
information to the magistrate for a determination whether the
predicted conduct, even if verified, provided probable cause to
justify an arrest or search.
C. Anticipatory Element of All Search Warrants
When considering the fourth amendment validity of anticipa-
tory warrants, the mere process of describing one type of search
warrant as "anticipatory" suggests that it is significantly different
from conventional search warrants and requires closer constitu-
tional scrutiny That suggestion, however, may be misleading be-
25 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1969). In a discussion of the
sufficiency of information from an undisclosed informant to establish probable cause to
search, the court stated,
The detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959), provides a suitable benchmark. While Hereford, the Govern-
ment's informer in that case, did not state the way in which he had obtained
his information, he reported that Draper had gone to Chicago the day before
by train and that he would return to Denver by train with three ounces of
heroin on one of two specified mormngs. Moreover, Hereford, went on to
describe, with minute particularity, the clothes that Draper would be wearing
upon is arrival at the Denver station. A magistrate, when confronted with
such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his infor-
mation in a reliable way.
In his concurring opinion Justice White stated,
So too in the special circumstances of Draper v. United States, (citation
omitted) the kind of information related by the informant is not generally sent
ahead of a person's arrival in a city except to those who are intimately
connected with making careful arrangements for meeting him. The informant,
posited as honest, somehow had the reported facts, very likely from one of
the actors in the plan or as one of them himself. The majority's suggestion is
that a warrant could have been obtained based only on the informer's report.
I am inclined to agree,
Id. at 426 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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cause virtually all search warrants are anticipatory in some respects.
Most search warrant affidavits present histoncal information, gamed
either by direct observation or through inference, providing prob-
able cause to believe that at the time the observation was made or
the information obtained there was probable cause to believe that
seizable items were on the premises to be searched. Based on these
past events, the magistrate anticipates that the seizable evidence
will remain on the premises until execution of the warrant.
Also, in some situations, including many drug searches, police
and the issuing magistrate understand that the specific drugs that
were observed on the premises on one occasion are not the same
ones that will be on the premises when the warrant is executed.
Instead, if drug distribution from the location listed in the warrant
appears to be an ongoing business, it is expected that the dealer
will have replaced the observed drugs with a new supply The
issuing magistrate, based on the historical information and because
of the nature of the drug trade, anticipates that some narcotics
will be on the premises when the warrant is executed. The same
analysis applies to a fencing operation where stolen items are
constantly coming in and going out of the premises. Specific items
observed on the premises on day one may not be there on day ten.
Yet based on the nature of continuing fencing operations, there
may be probable cause to believe stolen property will be on the
premises on day ten.
In another context, court orders authorizing a wiretap on an
individual's telephone are based on historical probable cause to
believe that an individual is currently engaged in cnminal activity
and it is probable that additional evidence of the criminal activity
will be obtained through a wiretap. 26 Wiretap authorization is not
- 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970 & Supp. 1990) states as follows:
Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or
modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electromc
communications within the territonal jurisdiction of the court in which the
judge is sitting (and outside that jurisdiction but within the United States in
the case of a mobile interception device authonzed by a Federal court within
such jurisdiction), if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted
by the applicant that-
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter;
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concermng that offense will be obtained through such interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
1990-91]
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based on the potential creation of probable cause, nor is it contin-
gent on a future event; instead, it is based on current probable
cause with the anticipation that additional evidence of the ongoing
crinunal activity will be created. The wiretap authorization bears
some relationship to an anticipatory warrant because both author-
ize seizure of evidence not currently at the location. With an
anticipatory warrant, however, no intrusion takes place until some
future event occurs. The wiretap intrusion is not conditioned on
the occurrence of any future event and is not within the previously
mentioned definitions of anticipatory warrants. 27
In Illinois v. Gates,n a case somewhat analogous to Draper v
United States,29 the search warrant was based on an anticipated
conclusion. 0 Police received an anonymous letter that suggested
the author's fairly close contact with the defendants. The author
predicted the defendants' future conduct, which included picking
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
(d) except as provided m subsection (I1), there is probable cause for
belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or
electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about
to be used, in connection with the commssion of such offense, or are leased
to, listed in name of, or commonly used by such person.
See United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1273 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906
(1977); United States v. Errera, 616 F Supp. 1145, 1148-49 (D. Md. 1985); see also United
States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1987) (using wiretap rules as a
guideline for video surveillance, the court found probable cause to search and authorized
video surveillance since other investigative techiques did not disclose enough evidence to
convict defendant).
27 It has been suggested that wiretap authorizations are anticipatory warrants because
the evidence to be seized is not yet in existence at the time of issuance of the warrant. See
W LAFAvE, supra note 8, at § 3.7(c), at 97. A major distinction between a wiretap
authorization and an anticipatory warrant is that with a wiretap, the intrusion by police is
based on existing probable cause and occurs without regard to the occurrence of any future
event. It is during the valid intrusion by wiretap that additional evidence becomes available.
In the anticipatory warrant situation, no intrusion is authorized until some additional event
takes place.
- 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
29 358 U.S. at 307; see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
30 The major difference between Gates and an anticipatory warrant is that in Gates
the non-criminal predicted conduct was verified and reported to the magistrate. Therefore,
probable cause was no longer dependent on a future event. In United States v. Goff, 681
F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982), police observed conduct consistent with an informer's report that
the defendant was in Florida to purchase drugs and transport the drugs back to Washington.
The officers did not see the defendant purchase or possess drugs. Nevertheless, once the
defendant was on a non-stop flight to Washington, agents obtained a search warrant for
defendant's person to be executed when he arrived in the issuing district. As in Gates, all
events pertainng to probable cause had occurred. Execution was dependent on a future
event, i.e., arrival of defendant in Washington. See infra notes 69-71 for a discussion of
whether an anticipatory warrant could have been issued in the Gates situation.
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up and transporting a shipment of drugs. Agents observed much
of the predicted conduct. However, no cnrminal activity was ob-
served. Much like Draper, there was no available proof, independ-
ent of a search, that the defendants violated the law. Nevertheless,
the Court concluded that based on verification of the predicted
non-crmunal conduct, the magistrate's determination of probable
cause was accurate.
In each of the previous examples, the issuing magistrate makes
an evaluation of historical probable cause and from that anticipates
the existence of future status, the seizable item remaining on the
premises. Recognition of that anticipatory element of conventional
search warrants is demonstrated by the many probable cause chal-
lenges to warrants based on the theory that the facts presented in
the affidavits did not support the magistrate's anticipation that
seizable items would be on the premises when the warrants were
executed.
The best illustration of a warrant's anticipatory element is the
frequent claim that probable cause is based on stale information.
A staleness challenge asserts that, regardless of the accuracy of the
historical fact in the affidavit and regardless of the conclusion that
probable cause may have existed at one time, the passage of time
makes it unreasonable to believe the item sought will still be on
the premises by the time the warrant issues or the search occurs.3'
" See, e.g., Sgro v. Umted States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932). The Court held that reissuance
of a search warrant was improper where the underlying information was not brought up to
date so that the issuing judicial officer could conclude that probable cause then existed. See
W LAFAV E, supra note 8, at § 3.7(a). Under FED. R. Cans. P 41(c)(1), a warrant may be
executed within a specified time up to 10 days after issuance. Execution within the statutory
period also may be invalid if the government agents learn of information negating the basis
for the probable cause finding:
Certain restnctions are placed on the execution of search warrants to
ensure that probable cause, as well as the veracity of the information in the
affidavit, exists when the warrant is executed. FED. R. Cans. P 41(c) mandates
that a search warrant must be executed within ten days of issuance. Unrea-
sonable delay in execution of the warrant that results in the lapse of probable
cause will invalidate a warrant. Thus, when a definite and material change
has occurred in the facts underlying the magistrate's determination of probable
cause, it is the magistrate, not the executing officers, who must determine
whether probable cause still exists. Therefore, the magistrate must be made
aware of any matenal new or correcting information.
United States v. Marm-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original);
see Segovia, 800 F.2d at 39; United States v. Nepstead, 424 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970); United States v. Moore, 742 F Supp. 727 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
In Skaff, 418 F.2d at 430, the court recognized that undue delay in the execution of
a warrant could cause the warrant to become stale. The prompt execution required is to
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Staleness goes directly to the anticipatory element common to most
warrants-that based on histoncal information it is probable that
the item (or its replacement) will still be on the premises.
Although most search warrants have an anticipatory element,
those search warrants whose execution is conditioned on a future
event have been singled out and labeled "anticipatory." Such
labeling suggests concerns beyond those accompanying more tra-
ditional warrants, concerns that are not adequately explained by
the label. One concern is that the magistrate has no historical basis
for concluding the existence of probable cause but still places a
search authorization, albeit conditioned on a future event, in the
hands of a government agent.
Underlying this concern is a perceived loss of judicial control
over the determination that there is or is not a basis to search.
With a conventional warrant, the judge has probable cause to
believe that evidence of a crime has been on a specific premises:
the location to be searched has been used to facilitate illegal activity
or conceal evidence. Intrusion by police on the premises is at the
direction of the magistrate, and later review of the warrant may
result in a generous interpretation of probable cause with little
sympathy for the victim of the search regardless of the results of
the search.32 In the anticipatory warrant context, the premises to
be searched may have no prior history of unlawful activity Per-
mitting any intrusion on the premises based on a police officer's
discretionary conclusion that the triggering event has occurred gives
that event paramount importance in the search process and places
execution of the warrant beyond the control of the neutral and
detached judiciary 33
ensure that the item for which the warrant is issued is the item that will be seized. Where,
however, police had an anticipatory warrant, the court was concerned that execution
"forthwith" would precede the anticipated delivery and thereby result in a search not
justified by probable cause. Premature execution is also discussed in Garcia, 882 F.2d at
699.
32 See Rivera, 728 F Supp. at 250 (In a civil suit asserting a fourth amendment
violation, the court found that an anticipatory search warrant was valid even though the
delivery was uncontrolled and no evidence was found on the premises.).
31 Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703 ("[W]e recognize that any warrant conditioned on what
may occur in the future presents some potential for abuse."); Segova, 800 F.2d at 41-42
(After issuance of an anticipatory warrant, new information that affects only the timing of
the search is within the discretion of the executing officers.); Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 655
("Defendant accurately perceives the vice of prospective warrants: By issuing such a warrant,
the magistrate abdicates to the DEA agents an important judicial function-the determi-
nation that probable cause exists to believe that the objects are currently in the place to be
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D Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
In addition to providing strong indications that anticipatory
search warrants are not invalid per se under the fourth amendment,
the Supreme Court's recent amendments to Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 41(a)34 permit some forms of anticipatory warrants
to be validly issued and executed. The old version of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(a) stated that a warrant to search may be issued by a judicial
officer "within the district wherein the property or person sought
is located . 35 It has been asserted that this rule required that
the property sought must be in the issmng district at the time of
issuance. In United States v Goff, 6 the court rejected that conclu-
sion, stating that the purpose of the requirement, rather than to
preclude anticipatory warrants, was to ensure that the property
seized is the same as that for which the warrant was issued.37
It appears that the new amendment to Fed. R. Crim. P 41(a)
is aimed at doing by rule what the district court in Goff did by
searched."); Skaff, 418 F.2d at 433 ("[A] warrant which antedates the commission of the
offense which is relied upon to support its issuance might lack an essential element of
judicial control: the requirement that probable cause exist to believe that execution will not
precede the commission of the crime or possession of the goods to be seized."); Glen, 331
N.Y.S.2d at 660, 282 N.E.2d at 617 (One issue was whether granting an officer discretion
as to whether or when to execute a search warrant makes the warrant unreasonable. To
reduce officer discretion, the court desired strong evidence that the delivery was likely.).
m The new amendments to FEn. R. CiuM. P 41(a) were sent to Congress in May
1990 and became effective in December 1990.
3 FED. R. Ciw. P 41(a) (1988).
- 681 F.2d at 1238.
37 Id. at 1240. In Goff a defendant suspected of transporting narcotics was on a non-
stop flight from Miatm to Washington State when the warrant was issued in Washington.
The warrant was issued to search the defendant when he arrved; the warrant did not specify
search of as yet unknown premises. Defendant could not alter his plans to arrive in
Washington because he was already en route. Nevertheless, warrant execution was condi-
tioned on the future event-defendant's arrival in Washington. Since the warrant could not
be executed until the defendant's arrival, there was no danger of seizing property other
than that sought in the warrant. Therefore, there was no violation of FED. R. Cne. P
41(a). The court stated that "[w]e do not interpret FED. R. Cn. P 41(a) to require that,
in every circumstance, the evidence sought must be physically m existence within the district
at the time the warrant issues." Id. (relying on Skaff, 418 F.2d at 430).
In a series of child pornography sting cases, it is not clear that the materials to be
seized were, in every instance, in the issuing district at the time of issuance. See Dornhofer,
859 F.2d at 1195 (materials to be seized may have been m Washington, D.C., when the
warrant was issued in Virginia); Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 33 (seized materials appear to have
been in New Jersey or Washington, D.C., when the warrant was issued m Virginia);
Washington, 852 F.2d at 803 (location of materials to be seized at the time of issuance of
the warrant is unclear).
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interpretation. The new rule replaced the old version of Fed. R.
Cnm. P. 41(a)38 with the following language:
Upon the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an
attorney for the government, a search warrant authorized by this
rule may be issued (1) by a federal magistrate, or a state court
of record within the federal district, for a search of property or
for a person within the district and (2) by a federal magistrate
for a search of property or for a person either within or outside
the district if the property or person is within the district when
the warrant is sought but might move outside the district before
the warrant is executed, and (3) by a federal magistrate for a
search of property outside the United States if the property is
lawfully subject to search and seizure by the United States and
is relevant to a criminal investigation in the district in wich the
warrant is sought.39
One purpose given by the advisory committee for the change
is to encourage anticipatory warrants in appropriate circumstances 4°
by making clear that such warrants are permissible. The advisory
committee note suggests that the new amendment permits issuance
of an anticipatory warrant in a district in two newly defined
circumstances. First, under the new version, an appropriate federal
or state judicial officer may authorize a search within the issuing
district for a person or property that it is anticipated will be within
the issuing district at some time in the future. The change is
accomplished by deleting a requirement in the old version that
permits issuance of a warrant only in the district in which the
person or property sought "is located." The warrant is anticipatory
because execution is conditional upon arrival of the person or
property in the issuing district.
3, The old version of FED. R. Cam. P 41(a) stated the following:
A search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued by a federal magistrate
or a judge of a state court of record within the district wherein the property
or person sought is located, upon request of a federal law enforcement officer
or an attorney for the government.
" FED. R. CRim. P 41(a) (1991).
,o The Committee Note accompanying the new amendments to Rule 41(a) begins with
a statement concerning the constitutional preference for warrants:
First [the new amendment] furthers the constitutional preference for warrants
by providing a mechamsm whereby a warrant may be issued in a district for
a person or property that is moving into or through a district or nught move
outside the district while the warrant is sought or executed.
Id. at advisory committee's note.
[VOL. 79
ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS
The second circumstance occurs when property or a person is
currently within the district in which the warrant is sought but the
property or person may move outside the district during the war-
rant application process or before its execution. Once properly
issued in one district, the warrant may be validly executed in
another. In this situation, however, the warrant must be issued by
a federal magistrate. Although labeled anticipatory in the commit-
tee note, execution of the warrant is not necessarily conditioned
on movement of the seizable item from one jurisdiction to an-
other.41
The purpose of the rule change is to recognize what the advi-
sory committee views as the practicalities of the situation. When
property is in transit, "there may be good reason to delay execution
until the property comes to rest." 42 By reference to "delay" of the
search, the advisory committee appears to acknowledge that it
contemplates situations where police could get a warrant to search
a container currently located in the issuing district but for tactical
reasons want the container to continue to its destination. The
"good reason to delay execution" would appear to be that set out
in Illinois v. Andreas:
The lawful discovery by common carriers or customs officers
of contraband in transit presents law enforcement authorities with
an opportunity to identify and prosecute the person or persons
responsible for the movement of the contraband. To accomplish
this, the police, rather than simply seizing the contraband and
destroying it, make a so-called controlled delivery of the container
to its consignee, allowing the container to continue its journey to
the destination contemplated by the parties. The person dealing
in the contraband can then be identified upon talng possession
of and asserting dominion over the container. 43 (footnotes omit-
ted).
41 The changes in the rule merely eliminate some potential jurisdictional objections to
anticipatory warrants. The newly approved anticipatory search warrants can be issued when
there is probable cause to believe that certain property is seizable. The property may be in
transit from one jurisdiction to another. Thus, the jurisdictional location and possibly the
specific premses of the search are in doubt. In those circumstances, a valid anticipatory
search warrant may be issued m either the jurisdiction of current location or the jurisdiction
of anticipated location.
42 FED. R. Cmm. P 41(a) at advisory committee's note.
41 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). The property seized m Andreas was
taken from the defendant outside his premises. The Court determined that re-seizure of the
recently delivered container and search for the previously discovered contraband did not
impinge on the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy. The facts did not involve any
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Application for a search warrant or execution of an already
issued warrant for containers in transit can be delayed in order to
identify the persons who eventually take possession of the con-
tamer. Obtaining a warrant in the shipping jurisdiction prior to
delivery to the addressee in the receiving jurisdiction permits police
to avoid potential delays and loss of evidence if they have to wait
until the shipment reaches the receiving jurisdiction before applying
for a warrant. Where the warrant is obtained in the shipping
jurisdiction, neither the validity nor execution of the warrant is
conditional. Rather, police are given discretion to execute the war-
rant at a time more conducive to gathering evidence of unlawful
possession or distribution.
For the delay tactic to be effective, officers usually must follow
the container to a resting place where a search of the container
and the place reveals evidence of the possessor's knowledge of the
contents. Carried to its logical conclusion, the advisory committee
would appear to authorize searches at locations that may not yet
be known or listed in the warrant and will be determined at the
executing officer's discretion.
The advisory committee, however, specifically rejected an in-
terpretation that permitted searches of locations not disclosed in
the warrant.44 The advisory committee stated that the proposed
intrusion into the defendant's premises.
The dissent in Andreas also acknowledged the validity of controlled deliveries:
I agree entirely with the Court that "controlled delivery" is a proper and
effective tool of responsible law enforcement (citations omitted). If contraband
is discovered in a package passing through customs inspections, the authorities
are not required to seize it then and there, but may make use of their discovery
to obtain more evidence and to capture the culprits behind the contraband.
The "controlled delivery" technique, however, would be just as effective, and
decidedly more proper, if the second search that came at its culmnation were
authorized by a valid search warrant.
Id. at 780-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In United States v. Singh, 811 F.2d 758, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1021 (1987), the court permitted police to re-seize evidence without a warrant even though
the evidence was inside the doorway of a warehouse. The court suggested that the search
just inside the door was not a general search of the warehouse.
" FED. R. Citim. P 41(a) at advisory committee's note. The advisory committee note
refers to United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), as an example where a warrant
might have been sought in the jurisdiction of shipment to search a container in the
jurisdiction of delivery. Police had probable cause to believe that a footlocker shipped by
air contained marijuana. Immediately after the footlocker was claimed and placed in the
trunk of a car, the footlocker was seized and searched without a warrant. The search was
invalid.
Note that the only search approved in the example given by the advisory committee
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rule does not "abrogate the requirement of particularity The
amendment would authorize the search of a particular object or
container provided that law enforcement officials were otherwise
in a lawful position to execute the search warrant without making
an imperussible intrusion." 45 This restriction is consistent with
cases involving particularity of the place to be searched. 46
The restriction is not consistent with the rationale that there
are valid reasons for delay The restriction limits a search to
locations where the police already have a right to be. Usually,
police will be able only to identify the person who has authority
to take the container from the shipper; receipt by such a person
may not demonstrate knowledge of the contents or intent to possess
the contents. As indicated in Andreas, these latter two conclusions
frequently will be the most important reasons for the delay in
seizure and search.
Nevertheless, the combined effect of the new amendments and
the advisory committee's note concerning encouragement of war-
rants and delay of a search appears to approve anticipatory war-
rants. When containers are in transit, either within or moving
beyond the issuing district, judicial review of the basis for an
intrusion and identification of persons with knowledge of the con-
tainer's contents are achieved by an anticipatory warrant specifying
the container or location to be searched. On the other hand, the
new rule may provide the government with one more forum for
shopping for judges who may be more inclined to issue a search
warrant.47
would be a search of the container m the receiving location, not the search of a premises.
In Chadwick police did not know the premises or jurisdiction in which the footlocker would
finally come to rest. The advisory committee thus would validate the warrant as long as
the container was m a place where the police had a right to be without a warrant.
Authorizing issuance of the warrant in the shipping jurisdiction and permitting a delay
of execution appears disingenuous in the Chadwick situation. The Court in Chadwick
permitted seizure of the container in the receiving jurisdiction on an exigent circumstances
theory. The Court merely prevented a search until a warrant was obtained. Immobilization
of the container while the warrant is obtained should eliminate concerns about loss of
evidence or a need to get a search warrant in the shipping jurisdiction.
4 FRm. R. Canm. P 41(a) at advisory committee's note.
46 See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
47 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). In adopting the good faith
exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the Court, although calling the
possibility speculative, at least acknowledged the possibility of magistrate shopping. "One
could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases where the police failed to demon-




The rule does not otherwise provide guidelines for defining an
anticipatory warrant or determining other circumstances in which
an anticipatory warrant is appropriate. In light of concerns about
expansive police discretion, the potential for magistrate shopping,
and the possible effects of the good faith exception, the viability
of an anticipatory search warrant in a specific circumstance should
depend on its purposes and alternatives.
E. Purposes and Alternatives
Inherent in the anticipatory warrant process is a potentially
broad grant of discretion to police. In situations where the trigger-
ing event is not within the control of police, the officer on the
scene will determine whether there is sufficient reason to believe
that the anticipated triggering event has taken place. The officer
decides whether the event justifying the magistrate's probable cause
determination has occurred. 8 The potential loss of judicial control
of the probable cause determination demands careful evaluation of
the anticipatory warrant process.
One method of evaluating the validity of anticipatory warrants
is suggested by the Supreme Court's review of other intrusions
asserted to be violations of the fourth amendment. In right to
privacy contexts, the Court balances governmental and societal
interests versus individual interests. 49 The balancing process in-
cludes examination of the purposes of the warrant and the avail-
ability of limitations and alternatives.
In Moore, 742 F Supp. at 727, police obtained an anticipatory warrant based on
a controlled delivery of drugs to the defendant's address by a police officer dressed m a
U.P.S. uniform. Unable to make delivery, the container was returned to the U.P.S. office
where it was picked up shortly thereafter by a person other than the addressee. Police
followed the car containing the drugs but lost contact with it after a high speed chase.
Police also attempted to maintain surveillance of defendant's apartment complex but dis-
covered too many entries to determine if the container was delivered to defendant. Never-
theless, the police concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the container was
delivered, and they executed the warrant. The court found the execution to be invalid but
found other reasons to validate the seizure.
11 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (utilizing a balancing approach in
deterinimng that a search warrant for third party premises was reasonable m light of
purposes and alternatives such as a subpoena duces tecum). It is also clear that most of the
current exceptions to the warrant requirement involve an analysis of the scope of the
intrusion versus the governmental or societal need for such an intrusion. See generally
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (applying a balancing analysis to a state court-ordered
surgical intrusion); Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913; Gates, 462 U.S. 213; Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Anticipatory search warrants serve two apparent purposes. One
purpose, reflected in the discussion on the revision of Fed. R.
Crim. P 41(a), is authorization of a prompt search warrant for
property that is being transported from one jurisdiction to another
so that evidence is not lost due to delays in obtaimng warrants in
the receiving jurisdiction. 50 A second purpose is to serve as an
adjunct to the approved investigatory tactic of "controlled deliv-
eries," which includes deliveries by agents of the government or
deliveries that can be observed by police.5' Also, anticipatory war-
rants have been approved to supplement investigations where un-
controlled deliveries are anticipated. Uncontrolled deliveries occur
when police have a tip that a delivery will occur but they will not
be able to observe or verify the delivery prior to warrant execution.
1. Controlled Deliveries
a. Purposes
In one typical controlled delivery scenario relating to unlawful
possession of drugs or other contraband such as machine guns,
police intercept the contraband during shipment. One obvious op-
tion for the government after interception is destruction of the
contraband. Along with destruction, the shipper, if known, and
the addressee may become targets of continuing investigation. Pros-
ecution of the shipper for possession or distribution based only on
interdiction of a shipment of contraband may be possible, but
prosecution of the addressee is virtually impossible because there
is no evidence of knowing possession. At best, the address label
might be useful in a conspiracy prosecution of the addressee.
Successful prosecution requires significantly more evidence, how-
ever, than merely being the addressee of the shipment. Therefore,
agents may attempt to make a controlled delivery of the previously
intercepted contraband to identify the person who takes possession
and control.52
In another frequently occurring situation, delivery of visual
depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct is nec-
essary to prove the crime of knowing receipt of pornographic
See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
52 Andreas, 463 U.S. at 765; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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materials from interstate or foreign commerce or from the mail.53
Possession of child pornography is not an offense; the offense is
knowing receipt of child pornography through the mail or interstate
or foreign commerce. Therefore, defendants can be convicted only
when delivery of the materials completes the offense. Interception
and destruction of child pornography materials merely keeps a
particular piece of material from the recipient and provides inves-
tigatory leads. Interception does nothing toward limiting the market
demand for such material. Some limitation of demand can be
achieved by increasing the risk of apprehension for all purchasers
through the apprehension of some purchasers. Controlled delivery
is one viable method of achieving that goal. 54
In both controlled delivery situations, delivery is the key to any
intrusion into a private premises to identify and prosecute persons
possessing contraband or receiving child pornography through the
mall. Implicit in the Supreme Court's approval of controlled deliv-
eries is the concept that a search subsequent to delivery will be
necessary to confiscate the contraband and to obtain significant
evidence of the recipient's involvement in the unlawful receipt,
distribution, or possession of the contraband. A search based on
an anticipatory warrant achieves those goals.
b. Alternatives
In evaluating whether a search is reasonable, the Court also
considers other options available to achieve the goals contemplated
by approval of the controlled delivery process. Availability of
viable options, however, will not necessarily render a search unrea-
sonable. 55 Other options currently available to police include the
following: (1) a post-delivery application for a search warrant,
53 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1970 & Supp. 1990); see supra note I1.
*' See Boffardi, 684 F Supp. at 1268; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
761 (1982).
" Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 559. In accepting the reasonableness of a search warrant for
the premises of a person not suspected of a cnme, the Court indicated that a potentially
less intrusive alternative means (a subpoena duces tecum) of gaining the same evidence did
not render the search unreasonable:
The Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and
public need, and there is no occasion or justification for a court to revise the
Amendment and strike a new balance by denying the search warrant in the
circumstances present here and by insisting that the investigation proceed by
subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory that the latter is a less intrusive
alternative or otherwise.
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either in writing or by telephone; (2) a pre-delivery affidavit setting
forth the circumstances surrounding the anticipated delivery fol-
lowed by a post-delivery telephone call to the magistrate verifying
delivery; or, (3) an exigent circumstances entry as an exception to
the warrant requirement.
The first option for police requires waiting until delivery and
then applying for a conventional warrant either in writing or by
telephone under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(2).5 6 Most courts have
determined that the time necessary after delivery to get either a
written or telephone warrant may be too long to avoid possible
loss of the evidence since drugs are easily repackaged and distrib-
uted from the premises. 57 Also, while waiting for a warrant, ad-
ditional events may occur that force police to arrest or intrude
without the benefit of judicial review 58 Therefore, post-delivery
warrants have not been constitutionally required.
FED. R. Cim. P 41(c)(2)(A) states,
General Rule. If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with
a written affidavit, a Federal Magistrate may issue a warrant based upon
sworn oral testimony commumcated by telephone or other appropnate means.
See Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 655 n.2.
In Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703, the court stated,
Yet, one of the major practical difficulties that confronts law enforcement
officials is the time required to obtain a warrant. In many instances, the speed
with which government agents are required to act, "especially when dealing
with the furtive and transitory activities of persons who traffic in narcotics",
demands that they proceed without a warrant or risk losing both criminal
and contraband.
See United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1987) (warrantless search of
defendant's apartment did not violate fourth amendment where the defendant received the
package in a controlled delivery, discovered that it had been tampered with, and could have
easily destroyed the evidence in the time it would have taken the police to obtain a warrant).
In dicta in Flippen, 674 F Supp. at 539, the court distinguished between the exigencies
involved in anticipatory warrants for drugs and for child pornography, stating that
The characteristics of drugs and child pornography differ greatly. Upon deliv-
ery drugs are used up or immediately distributed. If government officials are
not permitted to seize the drug deliveries immediately, the evidence may
disappear during the time spent securing a search warrant. On the contrary,
child pornography is not used up or distributed upon delivery.
11 In Andreas, 463 U.S. at 765, police observed delivery of a known shipment of
contraband to the defendant's prermses. Defendant left the premises with the recently
delivered container 45 minutes after delivery. The police sought a warrant but it was not
issued when defendant emerged from his premises. The officer on the scene arrested the
defendant and searched the package. The only basis for the arrest was possession of the
drugs that the officer believed were still in the container. The Court validated the arrest
and seizure because there was a substantial likelihood that the container still held the
contraband and that defendant had no expectation of privacy in a container that has been
intercepted and found to contain drugs.
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The second possibility is presentation of an affidavit to the
magistrate prior to delivery giving the magistrate all of the probable
cause information. As with an anticipatory warrant, the magis-
trate's approval of a search is conditional on delivery However,
the issuing court can require that prior to execution of the warrant
the officer telephone the magistrate and describe the events leading
to the officer's conclusion that the conditions have been fulfilled.
Only then would the magistrate make a final determination that
probable cause to search exists. Potential time loss in trying to
reach the magistrate by telephone and consequent loss of evidence
appear to be the primary arguments against requiring this process
as the inimmal method of satisfying the fourth amendment. 59
Absent some type of warrant or preliminary approval, a third
option after delivery is a search based on exigent circumstances.
One court appears to approve exigent circumstances entry in some
situations, even when there is a controlled delivery of narcotics. 60
Other courts take a more restrictive view and hold that exigent
circumstances do not exist when the police create the alleged exi-
gency 61 In a controlled delivery, police already possess the contra-
band, which they deliver to the defendant and thus deliberately
create the so-called exigency Permitting the manufacturing of an
exigency so that police can conduct a search and seizure in a
residence or business without a warrant would allow the exception
to consume one of the last remnants of the fourth amendment
warrant requirement.
59 In Gald-Roman, 816 F.2d at 76, the court found that a pre-search draft was too
burdensome and that requiring a telephone warrant after delivery presented potentially
insurmountable timing problems. The court specified that 20 minutes between delivery and
search was insufficient to reach a magistrate, explain the circumstances, and allow time for
a reasoned decision by the magistrate. But see Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 655 n.2 (after finding
an anticipatory warrant invalid, the court suggested that telephone warrants were preferred);
Gutman, 670 P.2d at 1173 n.5 (urging magistrates to require police to get a preliminary
warrant conditioned on a future event that must be called in to the magistrate for final
approval of the search); Commonwealth v. Douglas, 503 N.E.2d 28, 31 (Mass. 1987) (The
court suggested that the state has the burden of demonstrating that "time pressures made
it impractical to include in the warrant the precise place to be searched. There may well
have been time to submit to a magistrate, by supplemental affidavit, the location of the
place to be searched, once Trooper Sullivan informed other law enforcement personnel of
the location.").
- See Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d at 76; Singh, 811 F.2d at 758; see also United States
v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267 (Ist Cir. 1990) (search of a vilucle after a controlled delivery of
the vehicle as a container of narcotics was valid under the automobile exception although
exigent circumstances also warranted the search).
61 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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There appears to be even less reason to permit an exigent
circumstance exception for controlled deliveries of child pornog-
raphy. As indicated in United States v. Flippen,62 the exigencies
surrounding drug trafficking do not apply to child pornography
because, unlike many drugs, the pornographic material is kept for
personal use. Therefore, the material is unlikely to be removed
from the premises. 63
Another search option not often factually available occurred in
Illinois v. Andreas." The Court stated that once drugs are inter-
cepted they remain in the constructive possession of the police even
when placed back in the normal stream of commerce for delivery
purposes. The major difficulty with that concept is that once the
container is taken into a business or private premises, constructive
possession should not validate a warrantless intrusion to recover
the contraband. Therefore, where evidence of a defendant's accep-
tance, possession, and control is the goal, constructive possession
should provide little assistance. Nevertheless, in United States v.
Singh,6s the court opened the door, so to speak, by permitting a
warrantless intrusion into an area just inside a warehouse door to
recover the constructively possessed property. The court asserted
that constructive possession would not justify any broader intrusion
into the premises. 66
In the context of the above alternatives, the anticipatory search
warrant, at a minimum, better serves two purposes: it protects
privacy rights by providing for judicial scrutiny of potential prob-
able cause prior to entry by police;67 and it permits prompt entry
674 F. Supp. at 536. Although the Fourth Circuit issued no opinion in Flippen, it
previously accepted the validity of anticipatory warrants in a child pornography case. See
Dornhofer, 859 F.2d at 1195.
63 Fippen, 674 F. Supp. at 539.
463 U.S. at 765.
63 811 F.2d at 758.
The dissent claimed that a full search of the warehouse occurred. Id. at 763-67
(Kearse, J., dissenting). It is unlikely that the Singh rationale will be applied beyond its
facts.
67 The court in Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703, stated as follows:
Courts-though not yet the Supreme Court, to be sure-have upheld the
anticipatory warrant, in large part because they see it as desirable, whenever
possible, for police to obtain judicial approval before searching private prem-
ises. Indeed, the fourth amendment mandates that, with few exceptions, a
warrant be obtained before any search of a dwelling occurs.
Based on these considerations, we believe that the purposes of the fourth
amendment are best served by permitting government agents to obtain warrants
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to enhance the evidentiary value of the seizure while also increasing
the potential for recovery of the recently delivered contraband.
Prompt seizures without the potential time lost in seeking a post-
delivery search warrant may be vital to successful prosecutions.
Frequently, however, the anticipatory search warrant also au-
thorizes a search for and a seizure of additional evidence related
to the suspected offense. While apprehension of persons unlawfully
receiving or possessing child pornography or contraband is certainly
a justifiable goal, individual privacy rights should not suffer as the
means to the legitimate end. In the context of a search after a
controlled delivery, close scrutiny should be given to the scope of
the search so that the warrant does not become a general author-
ization to rummage through the recipient's possessions in a search
for anything of interest to the governmentY8
2. Uncontrolled Deliveries
Many potential deliveries of contraband about which police
have information will be uncontrolled. Concerns about timeliness
of the search and confiscation of contraband discussed under con-
in advance if they can show probable cause to believe that the contraband
will be located on the premises at the time that search takes place. We therefore
explicitly hold today what we assumed in Segovia [800 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986)]:
Anticipatory warrants are not unconstitutional per se, and in the proper
circumstances, may be an effective tool, both to fight criminal activity, and
to protect individual fourth amendment rights.
In Alvidres, 90 Cal. Rptr. 682, 685-86, the same concepts were utilized:
The entire thrust of the exclusionary rule and the cases which have applied
it is to encourage the use of search warrants by law enforcement officials.
We must ask ourselves whether the objective of the rule is better served
by permitting officers under circumstances similar to the case at bar to obtain
a warrant in advance of delivery of the narcotic or by forcing them to go to
the scene without a warrant and there make a decision at the nsk of being
second-guessed by the judiciary if they are successful in recovering evidence
or contraband. We believe that achievement of the goals which our high court
had in mind in adopting the exclusionary evidence rule is best attained by
permitting officers to seek warrants in advance when they can clearly dem-
onstrate that their right to search will exist within a reasonable time in the
future. Nowhere in either the federal or state constitutions, nor in the Statutes
of Califorma, is there any language which would appear to prohibit the
issuance of a warrant to search at a future time.
Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703, and W LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 3.7(c), at 96 cite the foregoing
language with approval. See Reviera, 563 A.2d at 1256 (anticipatory warrants provide police
with flexibility in responding to crime while ensuring oversight by a neutral judiciary).
" See infra notes 110-24 and accompanying text.
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trolled deliveries are applicable to uncontrolled deliveries, with one
additional problem. When the delivery is uncontrolled, police may
have no more information concerning the premises to be searched
after the anticipated delivery time than they had before. Probable
cause to search will depend on the credibility of the informant
providing the information that a drug delivery is to occur. 69 Con-
sequently, a search warrant application after the anticipated deliv-
ery time would present no greater probable cause information to
a magistrate than a pre-delivery application. It is irrelevant for
probable cause purposes whether the warrant is issued before or
after the anticipated delivery. Further, there would be no benefit
to the government or to the individual to delay the warrant appli-
cation or require a telephone call that provides no new information
after the anticipated delivery time.
Also, the exigent circumstances exception has a somewhat dif-
ferent application where the drug delivery is uncontrolled. Police
do not create the exigency that nught justify entry into a premises.
Nevertheless, when the circumstances creating probable cause are
anticipated in advance, treating such situations as exigent circum-
stances runs counter to accepted definitions of exigency, which
imply the sudden occurrence of unforeseen events. Even if the
meaning of exigency is expanded to include anticipated but uncon-
trolled deliveries, 70 the exigent circumstances should relate only to
the delivery of the seizable item and should not justify any search
beyond retrieval of the delivered material.
Further, when the magistrate relies on informant credibility to
determine the likelihood that the item will be on a premises,
conditions other than the passage of time can not be usefully
imposed because police are unaware of the circumstances of deliv-
ery Demal of a search warrant until predictions are verified may
cause delay resulting in a loss of evidence or a change in circum-
The Supreme Court has approved a totality of the circumstances analysis of prob-
able cause based on an informer's information. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 213. In Rivera, 728
F Supp. at 257 (citing Garcia, 882 F.2d at 699), the court stated that "Garcia requires that
an affidavit supporting an anticipatory warrant show that the agent believes there will be a
delivery, why he believes it, and how reliable are Ins sources of information." See also
Reviera, 563 A.2d at 1256 ("A statement by one who intends to participate in the crime
that is the object of the search warrant ordinarily provides a sufficiently reliable basis for
concluding that criminal activity will take place where and when he says it will.").
70 See Errera, 616 F Supp. 1145 (mobility of drug trafficking vehicles creates exigent
circumstances justifying warrantless search); State v. Bell, 477 A.2d 1272 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984) (mobility of vehicles and insufficient police manpower create exigent
circumstances that excuse the need to obtain a warrant).
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stances that gives rise to an exigency For instance, assume in
Illinois v Gates" that police observed the defendants, just prior
to reaching their home, drive their vehicle into a warehouse or
other location where drugs could be surreptitiously removed. Police
would then have multiple options. One possibility would be an
exigent circumstance entry to make an arrest. Draper would sup-
port probable cause for arrest, and entry could be based on a
variant of Dorman v United States 2 or the hot pursuit cases such
as Warden v Hayden.73 At a minmum, the police would be able
to seize the automobile while a warrant was sought. Possibly, the
automobile exception 74 would permit immediate search of the au-
tomobile. Under the current Supreme Court balancing analysis
where drug interdiction has become extremely important, it is
doubtful that the Court would impose rigorous limits on the gov-
ernment's ability to respond to a potential loss of a drug shipment.
In the hypothetical, it would be preferable that the agents have at
least an anticipatory warrant that discloses to the magistrate all
available information and sets forth conditions that must be met
or information that must be verified before police search the de-
fendants' property Variation from the conditions of the warrant
could require close scrutiny to determine whether police execution
of the warrant exceeded their limited discretion.75
If the goals of controlled deliveries posited earlier are valid
societal and governmental interests, then short of requiring police
to take a chance on losing the evidence through post-delivery
warrant application or expanding the exigent circumstance excep-
tion to include controlled deliveries, the anticipatory warrant may
involve the neutral and detached judiciary to the maximum extent
without also risking loss of evidence. As with any application, the
anticipatory search warrant affidavit serves as a pre-search listing
of available historical facts that police believe are important to the
71 462 U.S. at 213.
72 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
W 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
7 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
71 See Segovia, 800 F.2d at 39 (The anticipated delivery was unexpectedly made
piecemeal. A decision to delay execution beyond the time limit specified in the warrant did
not invalidate the search because police acted reasonably under the circumstances and the
new circumstances did not affect probable cause to believe drugs were on the premises to
be searched.); Moore, 742 F Supp. at 727 (failure to maintain observation of a "controlled
delivery" invalidated the anticipatory element of the warrant).
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probable cause determination. In addition, when compared to after-
the-fact assertions of exigent circumstances, the affidavit disclo-
sures prevent potential confusion as to what information was avail-
able to police prior to entry into the prermses. Finally, the affidavit
provides an opportunity for the magistrate to determine in advance
the proper scope of the search.
Additionally, in issuing an anticipatory warrant the magistrate
can list all predicate events necessary to complete probable cause
and trigger an intrusion into the listed premises. Such a warrant
achieves the goals of a controlled delivery while offering the mag-
istrate some control over the discretion of the police officer who
determines that the conditions of the warrant have been met. Any
deviation from the listed conditions should trigger detailed review
of the officer's decision to search.
III. REQUiREmENTS OF A VALiD ANTICIPATORY WARRANT
Evaluation of anticipatory warrants must include review of the
judicially imposed warrant requirements in each of the potential
fact patterns in which such warrants are sought. The requirements
should reflect both the requirements of conventional search war-
rants and the purposes of the warrant clause as reflected in the
balancing process likely to be used by the Court. Careful attention
should be paid to the following issues: (A) the basis for probable
cause to believe that the item specified is seizable by police; (B)
the degree of probable cause or certainty that the seizable item will
be delivered to a specified location; 76 (C) the specificity of premises
71 People v. Glen, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, 661, 282 N.E.2d 614, 617 (1972) stated the
following:
The remaimng question then is whether a prospective warrant, by not being
sufficiently limited, may allow an unreasonable search, particularly because it
involves some discretion in the executing officer whether and when to execute
it. Of course, even when there is present possession of the seizable property
the officer has a nmmal discretion not to execute the warrant if it should
appear to hni, from whatever source, that the possession is no longer the fact
at the time of expected execution. At best, present possession is only probative
of the likelihood of future possession. In cases like these [anticipatory war-
rants] the certainty of future possession is greater or is often greater than that
based on information of the past and presumably current possession.
The ultimate answer to the problem is that as long as the evidence creates
substantial probability that the seizable property will be on the premises when
searched, the warrant should be sustained. To be sure, where there is no
present possession the supporting evidence for the prospective warrant must
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to be searched; and (D) the appropriate scope of a search conducted
pursuant to an anticipatory warrant.
A. Seizable Item
The issuing court first should examine the degree of certainty
that a seizable item is involved at all. In many situations customs
officials have intercepted a shipment that contains drugs that are
unlawful to possess or child pornography that is unlawful to receive
in the mails. In those situations, it is generally certain that the
item sought may be validly seized. 7 In other situations police may
rely on an informant for probable cause that one is to receive a
shipment of drugs on a specified date.78 This latter situation raises
two problems-reliability of the informant 9 and degree of certainty
that delivery will occur.80
B. Delivery
Since two primary purposes of delivery of contraband for which
anticipatory warrants may be issued are identification of persons
assuming control of the contraband and completion of a crime,
the likelihood of delivery is a key ingredient in both the probable
cause determination and the execution of the warrant. Likelihood
of delivery has two facets-form of delivery of the item and
acceptance by the addressee or someone else.
1. Form of Delivery
The first concern is the degree of certainty that the contingent
future event (delivery) will take place. There are three general
delivery variations that can occur, each with a different impact on
certainty of delivery and, presumably, on probable cause and the
decision to execute the warrant.
be strong that the particular possession of particular property will occur and
that the elements to bring about that possession are in process and will result
in the possession at the time and place specified. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., United States v. Peden, 891 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1989).
See, e.g., Rivera v. United States, 728 F Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
71 Issues relating to informant reliability will not be discussed here. The issues are
explored in numerous cases. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v.
Hams, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
10 In Rivera, 728 F Supp. at 250, it appears that the anticipated shipment did not
occur. Further, the police discovered no other evidence of cnminal activity when they
searched. The court found that the police were not civilly liable because the affidavit
presented sufficient information disclosing why the officer believed the delivery would occur




Police may use a controlled delivery in which an undercover
police officer poses as a postal delivery person or as an employee
of a private carrier and personally transfers the contraband to
someone at the suspected address.8' This procedure leaves no doubt
that delivery will occur for probable cause purposes or has occurred
for execution purposes. It provides the highest degree of probable
cause that the contraband will arrive on the suspect premises or
into the hands of the suspect individual, and limits police discretion
over the decision to execute since the government agents can not
be mistaken about whether delivery to the appropriate location has
occurred.
b. Observed Delivery
In a second category of cases, police are able only to observe
material portions of a delivery Tis form of delivery also often is
referred to as a "controlled delivery." '8 2 The most common example
is where a container of contraband or pornographic materials has
been intercepted in the mail. The container is put back into the
mail or placed with a common carrier, and delivery by a non-
governmental employee to the defendant is observed. 3
Another example of an observed delivery is where an informant
is to deliver the suspect package to a specific address. Police may
be certain that the informant is carrying a package contaimng
contraband into a particular premises and then may observe the
informant leave the premises without the package.84
,1 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (delivery of a container concealing drugs
into defendant's possession by government agents posing as delivery men); United States v.
Musgrave, 726 F Supp. 1027 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (government agent posed as a delivery
person and delivered pornography to defendant); United States v. Boffardi, 684 F Supp.
1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (postal inspector dressed as a letter earner delivered matenal to
defendant).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 852 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1988) (observed mail
delivery); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (observed mail delivery).
3 See, e.g., Peden, 891 F.2d at 514 (observed mail delivery of child pornography);
United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988) (police observed mail delivery of
child pornography and observed defendant take the material into his premises); United
States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988) (observed mail delivery); United States v.
Singh, 811 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1987) (shipment of contraband was intercepted by customs
and delivery by a common earner was observed by agents); Hale, 784 F.2d at 1465 (observed
mall delivery).
" Cf. United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989) (Two drug couners were
intercepted at customs and then sent to make an observed delivery. The two couriers entered
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Still another fairly common example is where the addressee
picks up the container at the post office or at a common carrier
and is then followed to a final destination. Police may or may not
be able to observe the container enter the premises."
The foregoing situations provide police with varying degrees of
certainty of deliveries to specific locations. Absolute certainty does
not appear to be required. In Illinois v Andreas, in a different
context, the Court stated that perfect controlled deliveries of drugs
are virtually impossible and absolute certainty of delivery unattain-
able.86
the premises with a duffel bag contaimng drugs. Within 10 minutes and before the couners
left, police entered the premises.); see United States v. Roundtree, 694 F Supp. 1230
(W.D.N.C. 1988) (A couner was intercepted at an airport and then sent to make an observed
delivery. The court ruled that the delivery did not create exigent circumstances justifying
entry into the premises without a warrant.).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1987) (A package
contaimng drugs was intercepted and then sent on to the addressee's post office box.
Defendant was observed picking up the package and was followed to his premises. The
court approved an exigent circumstance entry to recover the contraband.); United States v.
Zygarowski, 724 F Supp. 1052 (D. Mass. 1989) (defendant observed picking up child
pornography at the post office and followed to his premises).
"Andreas, 463 U.S. at 765. The case involved a delivery to the defendant, who
accepted the package outside is apartment. Police observed the defendant drag the container
into his apartment. The container was out of police observation for 30 to 45 minutes. The
defendant then emerged from the apartment carrying the recently delivered container. In
discussing defendant's expectation of privacy in the container on re-emergence the Court
stated,
However, the rigors and contingencies inescapable in an investigation into
illicit drug traffic often make "perfect" controlled deliveries and the "absolute
certainty" demanded by the Illinois court impossible to attain. Conducting
such a surveillance undetected is likely to render it virtually impossible for
police so perfectly to time their movements as to avoid detection and also be
able to arrest the owner and reseize the container the instant he takes posses-
sion. Not infrequently, police may lose sight of the container they are trailing,
as is the risk in the pursuit of a car or vessel.
During such a gap in surveillance, it is possible that the container will
be put to other uses-for example, the contraband may be removed or other
items placed inside. The likelihood that this will happen depends on all the
facts and circumstances, including the nature and uses of the container, the
length of the break in surveillance, and the setting in which the events occur.
However, the mere fact that the police may be less than 100% certain of the
contents of the container is insufficient to create a protected interest in the
privacy of the container.
A workable, objective standard that limits the risk of intrusion on legit-
imate privacy interests is whether there is a substantial likelihood that the
contents of the container have been changed during the gap in surveillance.
We hold that absent a substantial likelihood that the contents have been




A third delivery possibility is an uncontrolled delivery Police
may be aware only that a delivery of contraband is to occur at a
particular time and place but be unaware of the person who is to
make the delivery 8 In that context, police may have to rely on
observations consistent with delivery by someone"8 or solely on the
information provided by the informant.8 9
In United States v Segova 9° police had information concermng
the time of a drug delivery to a specific address. Police observed
an individual enter the premises at the appropriate time carrying a
shoulder bag. That same individual left the premises within five
minutes without the shoulder bag. Although police shortly verified
a delivery through an informer, neither the validity of the warrant
nor its execution was premised on verification. Indeed, the affidavit
in support of the warrant stated that the informer would not be
able to re-enter the premises to confirm the delivery
In both observed delivery and uncontrolled delivery contexts,
varying degrees of certainty of delivery exist and varying degrees
of police discretion are exercised in deciding whether to execute a
warrant that is conditioned on delivery Several cases, however,
suggest that the item to be seized must be "on a sure course to its
destination, as in the mall "91 Other cases refer only to a
likelihood of delivery as the appropriate standard for issuance of
the anticipatory warrant.92 United States v Garcia states, "Nor
container previously opened under lawful authority.
Id. at 772-73.
'7 United States v. Segovia, 800 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986); Rivera, 728 F Supp. at 250;
United States v. McGriff, 678 F Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
u Segovia, 800 F.2d at 39 (police observed a person carrying a shoulder bag enter
premises and leave approximately five minutes later without the bag).
"Rivera, 728 F Supp. at 250 (based on an informant's statements that a delivery
would be made, police obtained and executed the warrant without any corroboration of
delivery); McGriff, 678 F Supp. at 1010.
9* 800 F.2d at 39.
91 See Hale, 784 F.2d at 1468 (delivery of pornographic material); Goodwin, 854 F.2d
at 36 (delivery of pornographic material); Dornhofer, 859 F.2d at 1198 (delivery of por-
nographic material); Washington, 852 F.2d at 804 (mail delivery of drugs); United States
v. Hendncks, 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984) (invalidating search of defendant's premises
because container, although addressed to the premises, was not on sure course to the
premises); see also United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1982) (person to
be searched was on a non-stop flight into the jurisdiction of warrant issuance).
92See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702 ("[W]hen a government official presents independent
evidence indicating that delivery of contraband will, or is likely to, occur, and when the
magistrate conditions the warrant on that delivery, there is sufficient probable cause to
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should it be otherwise, for even a warrant based on a known
presence of contraband at the premises rests also on the expectation
that the contraband will remain there until the warrant is exe-
cuted." 93
Most of the cases requiring that the item be on a "sure course
of delivery" are child pornography cases, where the item has been
intercepted in the U.S. mails or by a private shipper. The demand
that the materials be on a sure course of delivery is easy to impose
under those circumstances because the government can comply
readily Also, since acceptance of the delivery will constitute the
offense, certainty of delivery offers greater protection for persons
and premises for which there is no current probable cause of
criminal violations. The primary purpose of this requirement ap-
pears to be maintenance of judicial control over the execution of
the warrant. Note that once the warranty is issued, the likelihood
of delivery becomes irrelevant because execution is dependent on
actual delivery, as objectively determined by the executing officer,
not on the likelihood of delivery
In drug cases, courts appear to adopt the more traditional
probable cause standard. Likelihood of delivery is merely one
factor to consider. In many situations involving informers and
uncontrolled deliveries, the government simply cannot comply with
the "sure course of delivery" standard. Imposing the stricter stan-
dard would limit the number of situations in which anticipatory
warrants might be sought. Limiting the potential for anticipatory
warrants in drug delivery situations may result in police attempts
to rely on the exigent circumstance exception to the fourth amend-
ment to justify a post-delivery intrusion, 94 further reducing judicial
control over intrusions on privacy interests.
uphold the warrant.") (emphasis added); United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th
Cir. 1978) (magistrate needs only probable cause to believe that contraband will be on the
premises when the warrant is executed); Rivera, 728 F Supp. at 257 (although delivery was
uncontrolled and unobserved, the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that there
would be evidence of drug trade on the listed premises); Zygarowski, 724 F Supp. at 1059
(upholding warrant where there was a "very strong likelihood that defendant would return
home with a package"); see also McGriff, 678 F Supp. at 1010.
91 882 F.2d at 702 (citing W LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 701).
1" See Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d at 76 (approving an exigent circumstance entry after a
controlled delivery); Roundtree, 694 F Supp. at 1230 (holding that a controlled delivery
was not a basis for an exigent circumstance entry). See generally Singh, 811 F.2d at 758
(suggesting that exigent circumstances may justify re-seizing a controlled delivery). For a
discussion of exigent circumstances as an alternative to an anticipatory warrant, see supra
notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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Few cases discuss the proper standard for evaluating the offi-
cer's decision that a delivery, observed or uncontrolled, has taken
place. Where the delivery is uncontrolled, police generally rely on
an informer's information that a delivery is going to take place. It
may be impossible to verify the delivery or observe events consistent
with delivery. Nevertheless, as with conventional warrants, the
anticipatory warrant execution is valid based on the totality of the
circumstances. 9" When there is an observed delivery, exercise of
the officer's discretion will have to be objectively reasonable under
all the circumstances. 96
2. Acceptance of the Package
Another aspect of delivery that has an impact primarily on
successful prosecution, rather than on execution of the warrant, is
the degree of certainty that a seizable item has been accepted by
the addressee. With controlled delivery, and with many observed
deliveries, police have already seized the contraband once. Since
confiscation has already been achieved, the obvious purpose of
delivery is to identify persons involved in cnrminal activity and then
to recover the contraband once again. If police attempt a controlled
delivery or are observing a delivery and the container is refused,
then there is no basis to enter the addressee's premises.
In cases of knowing receipt of child pornography through the
mails, acceptance by the addressee may be necessary to the criminal
charge. For example, a spouse or other family member accepting
a package addressed to another member of the family may not
provide the evidence needed to prove knowing receipt by the ad-
" See Rivera, 728 F Supp. at 250 (requinng only that affadaivit show that agent
believed there would be a delivery, why he believed it, and how reliable his sources are).
9 See Segovia, 800 F.2d at 39. In Segovia, when the delivery did not occur in the
quantity anticipated, the officers delayed execution of the warrant while waiting for an
additional delivery. The court stated,
Their delay in light of the new information about the second kilogram was a
reasonable interpretation of the limitation to execute the warrant within one
hour of the arrival of the narcotics, since the full anticipated delivery had not
yet occurred.
Here, the reported delivery of a second kilogram of cocaine did not
implicate the magistrate's finding of probable cause, but affected only the
limitation to execute the warrant within one hour of the arrival of the nar-
cotics.
Id. at 42; see also State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (The
warrant should set forth "specific, objective criteria that are sufficient to assure that officers
will not execute the warrant prematurely.").
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dressee from the mail of the specific item of child pornography
Regardless of who accepts the delivery, the search is valid to
recover the delivered material and, depending on the scope of the
warrant, possibly to obtain other circumstantial evidence of know-
ing receipt of child pornography
For offenses that require only possession with knowledge of
the contents, delivery to a specific address is used as circumstantial
evidence of the addressee's knowing involvement in the offense. In
United States v Garcia,97 delivery of contraband to the premises
was the triggering event for-the search. Acceptance by a particular
person on the premises was not required. When police entered the
premises, the contraband was still in the delivery container and the
defendant was in another room. Nevertheless, the delivery, defen-
dant's presence, and other evidence was sufficient to convict de-
fendant on various drug conspiracy, importation, and distribution
charges.
C. Specificity of Premises
The fourth amendment requires that a warrant particularly
describe the place to be searched. For most anticipatory warrants
the government will know the ultimate destination of the contra-
band. In some situations, however, the contraband container may
be addressed to a business or the shipment is to be picked up by
the consignee at the carrier's place of business. In either situation,
police may want to follow the shipment to its final resting place
in order to identify the person who takes control. Police may not
be able to give the magistrate the ultimate destination of the
package at the time the warrant is sought but may want to search
a premises promptly when they believe that the shipment has
reached its final destination.
Assuming the validity of controlled deliveries as an investigative
tool and the need for quick action when the contraband reaches
its final destination, police generally have three options when they
do not know the ultimate location of the contraband. One option
is to obtain an anticipatory warrant authorizing search of the
"ultimate location" as determined by police. An alternative is a
telephone warrant after the shipment reaches a final destination.
As was discussed earlier, telephone warrants may not provide for
a sufficiently timely search. If neither an anticipatory warrant nor
'" 882 F.2d at 699.
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a telephone warrant is viable, police generally are forced to rely
on the exigent circumstances exception. If all three fail, then the
controlled delivery serves no purpose. Further, demal of an antic-
ipatory search warrant may provide drug dealers with a fairly easy
method of evading controlled or observed delivery traps by ar-
ranging for all containers to be picked up by persons unaware of
the contents of the containers.
Several courts have addressed searches after delivery to a pre-
viously unknown location. In United States v Singh,98 customs
officials intercepted a twenty-foot shipping container whose con-
tents included hashish. The container was addressed to the defen-
dant's business address. Police had no basis to arrest anyone until
delivery of the container allowed identification of the person taking
possession and control of the container. The shipment was placed
in normal delivery channels and police observed delivery to the
defendant's storeroom. The defendant and others began unloading
the container, placing some of the contents inside the storeroom.
When the container was approximately eighty-five percent un-
loaded, agents, without a warrant, seized the contraband inside the
storeroom.
The court noted first that no warrant was needed to re-seize
evidence that had already been validly seized; the item remained
in the constructive possession of the police. 99 To justify entry into
the storeroom to make the re-seizure the court analogized to exigent
circumstance seizures:
We are not confronted here with an unlimited search of appel-
lant's storeroom, but with the retaking of contraband located
just inside the open storeroom doors, under direct government
surveillance and constructively in the government's posses-
sion. In view of the minimal nature of the government agents'
intrusion and the need for continued surveillance, or an effective
substitute therefor, if the controlled delivery of narcotics was to
be effective, a reasonable argument might have been made
that, under the peculiar facts of this case, there was an '"urgent
need' that 'justif[ied]' a warrantless entry "100
The dissent asserted that the police had no basis for the seizure
on the defendant's premises.10' The exigent circumstances, if any,
" 811 F.2d at 758.
9 Id. at 761 (citing United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973)).
' Id.
,o Id. at 763.
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were created by police returning the hashish to the normal stream
of commerce for delivery to defendant' 0 2 Further, the police could
not claim a plain view observation as a basis for their seizure
because they were not validly on the premises when the observation
was made. Essentially, the agents did not seek an anticipatory
warrant, possibly because they did not know where the container
was going to come to rest. Nevertheless, the court wanted to allow
the government to use controlled or observed deliveries to identify
participants in drug distribution schemes. Therefore, to validate
the search, the court had to stretch some existing exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
Two state courts have reached opposing conclusions on the
failure to list a specific location in a search warrant. In Common-
wealth v Douglas,0 3 an undercover agent learned of a weekly
illegal floating poker game where drugs and large quantities of
money changed hands. The games were played early Saturday
morning, and the location of the game was chosen each Friday
night at a bar just before closing time. The agent obtained an
anticipatory warrant to be executed at the as yet unknown place
of the poker game. The agent was wired for sound and was to be
a participant in the game. Through the wire the agent would lead
other agents to the location to be searched. The court found that
the failure to specify the location was fatal to the search. The
delegation of authority to the police was considered too broad to
satisfy constitutional demands that the magistrate determine prob-
able cause to search a specific location. Thus, the warrant was an
invalid general warrant.
Alaska, on the other hand, validated a warrant that permitted
the police to follow defendant to an unknown destination and
execute a warrant to search./°4 The court ruled that the warrant
was not a general warrant because it authorized the search of only
one place-the place of concealment of a known container of
narcotics. 0 5 Thus, if the police can follow the container to its
'0 Generally, police cannot justify a search based on exigencies they create. United
States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 86 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d
944, 950 (5th Cir. 1983); see Roundtree, 694 F Supp. at 1238 (controlled delivery by
couners to a known address does not by itself justify an exigent circumstance entry into
the premises).
,.3 503 N.E.2d 28 (Mass. 1987).
104 State v. Moms, 668 P.2d 857 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
O Id. at 862. The Morris rationale is cited with approval in W LAFAVE, supra note
8, § 3.7(c), at 100.
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destination, then they can enter and search for the container.
Although approving the search, both the majority opimon and a
concurring justice stated that police should have as little discretion
as possible in deternumng probable cause.1°6
The concern about officer discretion helps explain those cases
which demand that the warrant be based on a delivery that is on
a sure course to its destination.' °0 In United States v Hendricks'08
customs agents searched a box shipped from Brazil to the defendant
at his home. The box contained cocaine. The defendant ran a
business named Brazilian Imports, and his business address had
been the delivery place of a previously intercepted card that con-
tained cocaine. Agents obtained a search warrant for the defen-
dant's residence that was conditional on the box being brought to
the residence.' °9 The box was shipped in a manner making pick-up
at the airport the only means of delivery After pick-up, defendant
was followed to his home and a search conducted.
On appellate review of the seizure, the court invalidated the
warrant, finding no link between the listed premises and the illegal
activity Since the box was to be picked up, the address on it was
merely for identification purposes. Once picked up, the box could
go anywhere. Thus, there was no basis to believe the box was on
a sure course to defendant's home.
The Hendricks warrant listed a specific location but was deemed
invalid because there was no probable cause to believe that the
contraband would ever be there. The container could have been
taken to other premises and the contraband removed before the
container reached, if it ever did, the listed location. At that point,
even an observed delivery of the container would no longer provide
probable cause to believe contraband was at the specified location.
Treating such a delivery to the listed premises as triggenng probable
cause to search affords agents discretion beyond that associated
with valid anticipatory search warrants.
In evaluating the importance of the specificity of location re-
quirement for a search warrant, the validity of warrants that seek
evidence that might be concealed at more than one location should
'0 Morris, 668 P.2d at 862-63 n.1 (Singleton, J., concurring).
'0 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
,01 743 F.2d at 653.
109 The warrant application rmstakenly stated that the box was already at the defen-
dant's home when it was still at the airport. This rmsstatement was not a factor m the
court's conclusion since the execution of the warrant was specifically conditioned on arrival
of the box at the defendant's home.
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be considered. Most jurisdictions approve such warrants.110 If the
particularity requirement demands only that the government list
multiple locations, then much discretion is given to the officers to
execute a very broad search. Agents are likely to execute the
warrant at all listed premises simultaneously in order to prevent a
defendant or a cohort from learning of one search and going to
other locations to destroy evidence. Thus, lack of specificity of
location should not be dispositive in situations where police are
validly observing delivery of a known shipment of contraband.
A warrant permitting a search of an as yet unknown terminus
of a drug shipment would appear to offer less opportunity for
police to intrude on pnvacy than does a multiple location warrant.
Nevertheless, there is a valid concern as noted in State v. Morris"'
that a container may stop in many locations before reaching a
"final" destination. Without some specificity of location in the
warrant, the officer has discretion to decide winch of the potentially
multiple stops is the one that the officer believes is the most
productive to search. Concern about police discretion can be some-
what alleviated by providing specific guidelines identifying attrib-
utes of one location that justify a search, or by requinng officers
to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of their choices.
D. Scope of the Search
As indicated earlier, an anticipatory search warrant based on a
future event such as delivery of contraband is not invalid per se."2
Most of the cases approving anticipatory search warrants also
approve clauses authorizing searches that extend beyond mere re-
covery of the recently delivered contraband. In addition to the
initial question of issuance of a properly limited warrant, reviewing
courts should be sensitive to the warrant's execution so that the
warrant is not merely a subterfuge for officers to enter premises
" In United States v. Scott, 555 F.2d 522, 527 (5th Cir. 1977), the court approved a
warrant to search for evidence of gambling at defendants' "headquarter residences and
vehicles." It was probable that the items would be at one or more of those locations. Police
had no specific information as to the precise location of the evidence. The court, however,
permitted the normal inferences that the type of evidence sought would normally be located
in the various locations. See also State v. Ernst, 264 N.W.2d 677 (Neb. 1978) (search
warrant listing three locations held valid due to transience of the defendant). W LAFAvE,
supra note 8, at § 4.5(c), contains a listing of multi-location search cases.
"1 668 P.2d at 862, 863 n.1, 865 (expressing concern in the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opimons).
,,2 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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for a protective sweep or to get into position to make a plain view
observation and seizure. In evaluating the appropriate scope of
warrants, affidavits in support of such warrants should demon-
strate probable cause to believe additional evidence is on the prem-
ises and should specify the nature of that additional evidence.
When police seek an anticipatory warrant, there will be varying
quantities of information concerning the person or place involved,
ranging from probable cause concerning the criminal activity in-
dependent of the future delivery, to only suspicion about the person
or place, to no information at all. Obviously, in addition to the
delivery, the authorized scope of the search generally will be tied
to the quantity of information available concerning illegal activity
on the premises or related to the delivery
In two slightly different fact situations, the quantum of infor-
mation already available to police, or when used in conjunction
with defendant's name as addressee of a known shipment of con-
traband, may be sufficient to support a search warrant without
reliance on actual delivery For example, police may have probable
cause to believe that an individual is distributing narcotics and that
evidence of that cnme is currently in the individual's residence.
Police also may reasonably believe that an immediate search will
not produce evidence strong enough to result in a conviction for
narcotic distribution. Therefore, police may wait for a more pro-
pitious time to attempt to seize evidence against the defendant.
Discovery of the defendant's name on a confirmed shipment
of drugs provides the timing tool that will make a search most
effective. Police will now seek a warrant to search for the item to
be delivered as well as other evidence of the offense. Based on the
additional information known about the defendant, a search be-
yond mere retrieval of the delivered shipment may be justified.'1
"1 See Washington, 852 F.2d at 805. The court found that a warrant was sufficiently
specific for a broad search when based on an affidavit that stated the following:
Based on the probable cause developed in this investigation, it is the
belief of your affiant that there is currently secreted inside the premises of
3016 Sunset Lane, Suitland, Maryland, a quantity of drug paraphernalia,
papers, notes, bank records, identification documents and other items of
evidence that will identify the person using the name Ms. Ajoke Olushola and
others involved in this conspiracy to import and distribute heroin.
Id. at 805. In Rivera, 728 F Supp. at 257, the court approved a broad search warrant that
did not result in any seizure. The court stated,
Using a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis the magistrate had a
"substantial basis" to conclude that evidence of drug trade would be found
in plaintiffs' apartments. The informant had a record of proven reliability and
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However, execution of the warrant, in spite of probable cause
unrelated to the delivery, probably will not occur if the controlled
delivery does not take place because of the importance of the
delivered items in the ultimate prosecution of the defendant. Thus,
for tactical reasons police may request a search warrant whose
execution is conditioned on the occurrence of a future event.
Alternatively, police may have merely a reasonable suspicion
that an individual is engaging in illegal drug activity but may not
have probable cause to initiate a search for evidence.11 4 Or, infor-
mation concerning the defendant's drug activity may be stale. In
both situations, discovery that the individual is the addressee of a
shipment of drugs may give the police current probable cause, not
only as to the shipment when delivered, but also to believe that
other evidence of the suspected offense is on the premises. Oncd
had obtained the critical information about plaintiffs' apartments from Mol-
ma, one of the leaders of the drug ring. The informant asserted that he had
directly observed Molina use keys to open the doors to several apartments.
"[A] balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of
reliability (and unreliability) attending [the] informant's tip," supported a
finding of probable cause.
Id. at 251. In McGriff, 678 F Supp. at 1016, the court validated a search warrant under a
totality of the circumstances test, noting that one factor was that the government's informer
was a "confessed participant in an imminent crime." In Gutman, 670 P.2d at 1166, the
court approved a search of defendant's premises for items related to drug distribution.
Here, instead of a delivery to the defendant, the search was conditioned on an observed
delivery of drugs by the defendant. The court stated,
In addition, there was ample evidence to establish the likelihood of
Gutman's personal participation in the imminent sale. Alvalina's repeated
references to Gutman as her source, her representation that he was continu-
ously available and WH-8's independent observation of Gutman making nu-
merous deliveries of cocaine to Alvalina's apartment could all properly be
relied upon by Judge Crutchfield to find probable cause to believe that Gutman
was to play a part in the anticipated cocaine sale.
Finally, the state presented adequate information to Judge Crutchfield
linking Gutman's drug related activities to his residence.
Id. at 1171.
"4 In Garcia, 882 F.2d at 701, an anticipatory warrant was issued for "cocaine, traces
of cocaine, currency, drug records, and narcotics paraphernalia." The court stated that
issuance of the warrant preceded delivery and was "without any probable cause to believe
that contraband was currently located on the premises." The court later stated,
Had the only evidence been that the duffel bags were being delivered to the
apartment, the scope of the search, described in the warrant might have been
overbroad. Here, however, additional facts in the supporting affidavit gave
rise to probable cause to believe that the apartment was being used as a storage
and distribution center for drugs. Coupled with the delivery of the drugs
by Hooks and Oliver according to the plan set by [defendant], these facts




again delivery may not be necessary to probable cause.1 s The
interception 3f a shipment of drugs to an individual suspected of
drug distribution, together with other available information, may
be sufficient to get a warrant to search the individual's premises
for other evidence of drug distribution. The delivery of the ship-
ment and its acceptance by the defendant provide stronger evidence
for a trial on drug distribution charges, but delivery and acceptance
may not be necessary to define the scope of the search.
Therefore, in both situations of preexisting probable cause and
suspicion, the delivery affects the timing of the search. If the
warrant execution was' conditioned on delivery for tactical reasons,
it is a conditional warrant. The scope of the search, however, will
be determined not by the delivery but by the additional information
presented in the warrant.
A second general category of cases to consider are those where
police have little or no information concermng the recipient of the
delivery other than the delivery itself. Therefore, no probable cause
to search exists without the delivery 116 Delivery is not merely a
timing tool for gathering the greatest amount of evidence possible.
Without more information, acceptance of a package of drugs
should provide probable cause only to enter the premises to retrieve
the recently delivered package and not a basis for seizure of ad-
ditional evidence related to the drug trade. 1 7 However, when the
" Because police are unlikely to execute an anticipatory warrant without delivery to
the described premises, there are no cases that hold that merely being an addressee of a
shipment of drugs, together with other information, is sufficient probable cause to search
for other evidence of drug distribution. People v. Singer, 354 N.Y.S.2d 178 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1974), however, comes closest. Police obtained a warrant for defendant's premises
conditioned on an observed delivery to the premises. The warrant specified seizure of the
observed delivery, other drugs, paraphernalia, and written records of drug trafficking.
However, the delivery by Railway Express to the defendant's premises did not take place.
Instead, the defendant went to the Railway Express office to pick up the shipment. The
defendant was arrested when he accepted the shipment. The court approved the subsequent
search of the defendant's premises because probable cause was established by the previously
available information and the defendant's arrest with a significant quantity of drugs in his
possession.
116 See United States v. Weber, 915 F.2d 1282, 1287 (9th Cir. 1990) (In limiting the
scope of a search under an anticipatory warrant, the court noted that there was no
information establishing probable cause as to any evidence other than the delivery.). In
United States v. Moore, 742 F Supp. 727, 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), the affidavit set forth no
information concerning other drug activity at the premises. Without information in addition
to the controlled delivery, there was no probable cause to believe that the premises would
contain records of other drug transactions.
",7 See Moore, 742 F Supp. at 727. In United States v. Feldman, 366 F Supp. 356,
363 (D. Haw. 1973), the court found that a warrant authonzing seizure of "documents and
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quantity of drugs is a distributable amount, given the realities of
the drug trade, it should take very little to justify probable cause
to expand the search to look for records and other items commonly
used in drug distribution.11 Once the scope is expanded to include
other concealed items, the entire premises is opened for inspection,
and all items in plain view during the validly authorized intrusion
are also subject to seizure.119
Cases dealing with delivery of child pornography involve slightly
different considerations. In most reported cases, police have sub-
stantial background information on the defendant-addressee and
have probable cause to believe that the defendant possesses seizable
evidence other than the controlled delivery 120 However, proof of
the offense, which is receipt of child pornography from the mail,
not merely possession, is made possible by the controlled delivery
Acceptance of the controlled delivery establishes the probable cause
instrumentalities relating to the shipment and ownership of marijuana" was too broad.
Further, the court noted that "It]here being no such facts and circumstances set forth in
the affidavit here, there would have been no probable cause to list the items in question in
the search warrant. Therefore, even if they were so listed, their seizure under the warrant
would have to be voided for lack of probable cause." The court went on to hold that once
the delivered package had been seized, police had no basis to continue to make any
observations on the premises. Id. at 364; see also United States v. Nelson, 847 F.2d 285,
289 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (seizure of books not authorized when warrant
described only films and photographs).
"I See Segovia, 800 F.2d at 41 (Without any apparent challenge to probable cause to
seize items other than the anticipated delivery, the court indicated that the only information
police had concerning defendants was a sample of cocaine, the delivery, and the informant's
earlier statement that defendants were trafficking in cocaine. Seizures of the delivered
package, "drug paraphernalia, money, records and a pistol" were validated.); Rivera, 728
F Supp. at 256 (scope of search justified by informant's claims that the delivery would be
packaged and redistributed and by officer's prior experience at the address); Commonwealth
v. Soares, 424 N.E.2d 221, 225 (Mass. 1981); see also Weber, 915 F.2d at 1284 (Expert
information concermng "child molesters," "pedophiles," and "child pornography collec-
tors" was meamngless in a probable cause determination where there was no evidence that
defendant fit into one of the listed categories.); Peden, 891 F.2d at 518-19 (Based on the
expertise of the investigator in child pornography cases, the court indicated that a magistrate
could find probable cause that certain categories of evidence would be on the premises of
a pedophile even though the police had no direct evidence that the specific defendant had
or would have those items on his premises. The expert also presented information from
which the magistrate could conclude that the defendant was a pedophile.).
"I See Soares, 424 N.E.2d at 223-24. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), also
has been cited as a viable basis for seizure of items not specifically listed in the warrant.
110 See United States v. Flippen, 674 F Supp. 536, 537 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 861
F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1988) (The court ruled that a warrant based solely on a controlled
delivery was invalid for seizure of the delivery. However, the listing of other seizable
materials in the warrant was supported by probable cause without regard to the controlled
delivery. Therefore, those materials could be validly seized.). But see Weber, 915 F.2d at
1287 (insufficient information in addition to delivery).
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justifying execution of the warrant. Once delivery is accepted and
the crime committed, police will want to search to re-seize the
delivered material. Police also will want to seize other circumstan-
tial evidence supporting the charge, such as other child pornogra-
phy, supplier lists, correspondence, and order forms relating to the
controlled delivery None of the latter materials are illegal to
possess, but they support the charge of illegal receipt. Once again
the scope of the search is extensive.
Other than attacking the anticipatory element of the warrant,
defendants generally have been only modestly successful in chal-
lenging the existence of probable cause to engage in a search
broader than mere retrieval.' 1 Additionally, defendants have had
some success challenging seizure of specific items because the war-
rant was overbroad or the items were not specifically described in
the warrant. For example, two cases have ruled that authorization
for the seizure of child pornography does not justify seizure of
adult pornography 122 Other cases, however, have been more
"I Weber, 915 F.2d at 1282; Moore, 742 F Supp. at 727. But see Peden, 891 F.2d at
514, where defendant asserted that there was no probable cause to seize any material other
than the controlled delivery. The court suggests there was a strong basis for probable cause
to seize the additional circumstantial evidence. In addition to personal information con-
cerning the defendant, the court also appeared to consider a general statement about the
type of materials that a pedophile would keep on the premises:
In addition, based on her experience investigating pedophiles and the sexual
exploitation of children, agent Forman's affidavit asserted that pedophiles
often maintain certain other types of materials: large collections of books,
magazines, videos, and films containing child pornography; the addresses of
and correspondence with other pedophiles; and supplier lists, order forms,
and other documents pertaining to the purchasing, ordering, and advertising
of child pornography.
The magistrate was also presented with Agent Forman's testimony, based on
her substantial training and experience, that pedophiles often collect large
quantities of certain types of child pornography, and that they correspond
with other pedophiles on the subject. Although the affidavit lacked direct
testimony that Peden himself was this type of compulsive pedophile, the
magistrate might reasonably draw such a common-sense conclusion from the
repeated documented instances of Peden's sexual interest in young boys.
Id. at 516-18. However, rather than decide the probable cause issue, the court validated the
seizures under the good faith exception. Id. at 519; Hale, 784 F.2d at 1469 ("The portion
of the warrant that specifically described 'Bambino' and the three sets of photographs is
valid."); Boffardi, 684 F Supp. at 1263 (seizure of additional material properly authorized).
' See Hale, 784 F.2d at 1469 (Seizure of specified material was valid. Seizure of
material under a general clause authorizing seizure of 'obscene, lewd, lascivious or inde-
cent' material" was invalid.); Musgrave, 726 F Supp. at 1034 (Seizure of adult pornography
was outside the scope of a warrant authorizing seizure of child pornography.).
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expansive in approving seizure of other sexually explicit materials'2
or have used plain view as a basis for seizing additional material.124
One potential concern common to both drug and child por-
nography cases is that police may be permitting or encouraging the
delivery of contraband as a subterfuge for a plain view observation
or for a protective sweep of the prenuses. That concern does not
appear to be a major issue. If police have probable cause without
the anticipated delivery and are merely using the delivery as a
timing device, then the scope of the search will be the same with
or without delivery The same opportunities exist to abuse the
search process in each situation. Therefore, unless it is constitu-
tionally offensive to use an anticipated delivery as a timing device,
police actions have not altered the scope of the possible search.
Also, if delivery is required to generate probable cause to
search, then the police conduct of permitting delivery is valid if
the purposes of controlled delivenes are valid. Thus, if identifying
the defendant and timely re-seizure of at least the evidence of an
accepted delivery are appropriate purposes, then police are not on
the premises solely as a subterfuge for a broader search. The
validity of the scope of the search, whether by sweep of the
premises'2 or by plain view, is governed by considerations unre-
lated to the validity of the anticipatory search warrant. Addition-
123 See Dornhofer, 859 F.2d at 1198 (The court ruled that a warrant is sufficiently
specific when it "describes the sought for material 'in the graphic terms of the statute on
the sexual exploitation of children."'); United States v. Rabe, 848 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.
1988) (The warrant was not overbroad in permitting the officer to search for materials
"depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct as those terms are defined in 18
U.S.C. 2255."); see also Peden, 891 F.2d at 517-18 (suggesting that the specificity in
Dornhofer was sufficient); Nelson, 847 F.2d at 289 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (Although not
discussed directly in the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion suggests that seizure of
paperback books was not within the authorization to seize "films or 'photographic depic-
tions of minors involved in sexually explicit conduct ').
'1" See Musgrave, 726 F Supp. at 1034-35 (The court ruled that seizure of adult
pornography videotapes was not witlun a warrant for child pornography. However, in order
to determine if the tapes were seizable, police were permitted to view the tapes. Once
viewed, police had probable cause that the adult tapes were evidence of defendant's predis-
position to possess pornography.); see also Dornhofer, 859 F.2d at 1195 (Items not specif-
ically listed in the warrant could be used to show defendant's predisposition to possess child
pornography and counter a claim of mistake as to the content of the materials that were
ordered by defendant.). But see Hale, 784 F.2d at 1469 (The court invalidated a seizure of
a magazine because it was not specified in the warrant. Citing Maryland v. Macom, 472
U.S. 463 (1985), the court found that seizure of material protected by the first amendment
"requires that the Fourth Amendment be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude' in such
circumstances.").
"I Maryland v. Buie, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (protective sweep
during an in-home arrest is permitted).
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ally, if police claim to be relying on an informant in an uncontrolled
delivery situation, the potential for police fraud appears no greater
than in other undisclosed or unknown informant situations'21 and
again is unrelated to the validity of anticipatory search warrants.
IV GooD FAI EXCEPTION
Although anticipatory search warrants are not illegal per se, it
is possible that they may be invalid for failure to meet fourth
amendment requirements. Where the warrant is invalid, an addi-
tional issue to consider is the application of the exclusionary rule's
good faith exception to the issuance and execution of the warrant.
Exclusion of evidence is designed to deter police from unrea-
sonable intrusions on individual privacy When police have a search
warrant on which they reasonably and in good faith rely to seize
evidence, exclusion no longer serves as a deterrent. In those situa-
tions, the invalid warrant and the ensuing intrusion are the result
of a mistake by the magistrate. The Supreme Court has determined
that exclusion of evidence does not have a significant deterrent
effect on the magistrate. 127
The Court also has delineated circumstances where the good
faith exception is unavailable. A seizure is invalid if the officer
knowingly or recklessly provides false information that was nec-
essary to the probable cause determination, if the sigmng magistrate
abandons the neutral and detached role of the judiciary, or if,
under all the circumstances, the officer relied on a "warrant based
on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."' 128 In short,
police must demonstrate objective good faith.
Several courts have considered application of the good faith
exception to seizures made pursuant to anticipatory warrants. 129
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 213.
' See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984).
,2 Id. at 923.
129 United States v. Weber, 915 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1990) (The court found that the
affidavit was so deficient that official action based on the warrant was unreasonable.);
Umted States v. Peden, 891 F.2d 514, 519 (5th Cir. 1989) (Where defendant claimed that
there was no probable cause to issue a warrant for items other than the controlled delivery,
the court applied the approved Leon good faith review of issuance of the warrant.); United
States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hendncks, 743
F.2d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Moore, 742 F Supp. 727, 737 (N.D.N.Y.
1990); United States v. McGriff, 678 F Supp. 1010, 1016-17 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); United States
v. Flippen, 674 F Supp. 536, 540 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1988) (no
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When applying the good faith exception to either an anticipatory
or conventional warrant, care must be taken to analyze indepen-
dently its application to warrant issuance and to warrant execution.
Review of the circumstances of the anticipatory warrant's issuance
should proceed under the traditional approach to the good faith
exception. Defense claims of reckless disregard of the truth, 30
failure of the magistrate to remain neutral and detached,131 and
inappropriate reliance by a police officer on a warrant obviously
lacking indicia of probable cause 132 attack the basis for probable
cause and the magistrate's fidelity to her trust. Regardless of which
type of warrant is challenged for failure of probable cause, review
involves identical considerations.
The anticipatory warrant, however, adds an element to warrant
execution that should not be the subject of the good faith excep-
tion: evaluation of the objective determination by police, a discre-
tionary decision, that the contingent event tnggenng the intrusion
has occurred.133 This is unlike a conventional warrant where police
opinion) (After finding that anticipatory warrants for child pornography based solely on
controlled deliveries are invalid for lack of probable cause, the court, without discussion,
ruled the evidence admissible under the good faith exception.); State v. Wright, 772 P.2d
250, 258 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (Swanstrom, J., concurring).
I3 See, e.g., McGriff, 678 F Supp. at 1017 (The court ruled that misstatements in the
affidavit were irrelevant to the magistrate's probable cause deterrmnation. The court then
ruled that the police were objectively reasonable in relying on a warrant that was prermsed
on an uncontrolled delivery.).
"I See, e.g., Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 653. The court ruled that the warrant was invalid
because there was no nexus between the observed delivery and the premises listed in the
warrant; the warrant lacked probable cause. The defendant urged that under the circum-
stances, the magistrate had abandoned judicial neutrality. The court responded that "[a]lthough
the magistrate impermissibly delegated an element of probable cause determination to the
DEA agents, i.e., whether the suitcase was at the house, it appears from the record that he
did so in an effort to limit official conduct, not expand it. The magistrate did not abandon
his judicial role to the officers, and the officers' reliance on the warrant was not unreason-
able." Id. at 656.
"I See, e.g., Weber, 915 F.2d at 1289; Peden, 891 F.2d at 519; Hale, 784 F.2d at
1469-70 (First the court ruled that the warrant was overbroad in permitting seizure of
'obscene, lewd, lascivious or indecent' material." The court then ruled that a reasonably
well-trained officer would know that materials arguably protected by the first amendment
were not seizable under such a broad provision in a warrant. Thus, execution of the warrant
was not objectively reasonable.); Moore, 742 F Supp. at 738; Flippen, 674 F Supp. at
541; Commonwealth v. Douglas, 503 N.E.2d 28, 31 (Mass. 1987) (After ruling that an
anticipatory warrant that did not specifically designate the premises to be searched was not
invalid per se, the court stated that the "particularity requirement was not met here, and a
police officer can never validate a general warrant through objectively reasonable reliance
on the warrant.").
" See Hale, 784 F.2d at 1470 (police officer had not acted in good faith when he
seized, pursuant to an overbroad warrant provision, materials arguably protected by the
first amendment); Moore, 742 F Supp. at 738 (The court refused to apply the good faith
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are instructed to proceed with the search. Only in the event of new
information that eliminates the probable cause basis for the warrant
would police have any constitutional obligation to refrain from the
intrusion.
With an anticipatory warrant, the executing officer is well
aware that the magistrate has not approved the search in the
absence of the triggering future event. Occurrence of the future
event, by definition, could not be a part of the magistrate's prob-
able cause determination. Since tis discretionary determination
that the triggering event has occurred has not been subjected to
judicial review, it should not be tested by the officer's good faith
belief that the event occurred, but instead should be reviewed by
the objectively available facts without regard to good faith. The
deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule has direct application
to the officer's decision to search.
The degree of certainty of delivery required under the specific
facts or in the warrant itself also should play a role m the analysis
of the validity of the execution. For example, jurisdictions requiring
that the contraband be on a "sure course of delivery" may rea-
sonably demand greater objective proof of delivery than might be
requred where the delivery is uncontrolled. In the former situation,
it is arguable that delivery should be objectively certain, while in
the latter merely objectively reasonable. 134 Any greater requirement
would almost certainly render anticipatory warrants based on un-
controlled deliveries invalid.
CONCLUSION
Anticipatory search warrants currently serve both governmental
and individual privacy interests. Of primary importance, the
exception where the officer "never witnessed the delivery; nor did he learn of the delivery
from any source, much less a reliable source."); Douglas, 503 N.E.2d at 31 (When faced
with a warrant where the location of the search was left to the officer's discretion, the
warrant was invalid as a general warrant and an officer could never validate the seizure by
objective good faith.).
' See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. When there is an uncontrolled
delivery, the police decision to enter the listed premises often will be a probabilities reaction
based on observation and expertise. McGriff, 678 F Supp. at 1010, involved an anticipatory
warrant based on an uncontrolled delivery where agents had no information to report
concerning the delivery. Execution was based on the reliability of the informant advising
that a delivery would occur. There was no challenge to the warrant execution. See Rivera
v. United States, 728 F Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (The affidavit supporting an
anticipatory warrant need only show "that the agent believes there will be a delivery, why
he believes it, and how reliable are his sources of information." Again, the defendant did
not attack the decision to execute even though there were no observable facts that the
officer could report to demonstrate delivery.).
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warrants provide judicial review of the bases for potential intru-
sions into private premises. The supporting affidavits should lock
police into a statement of known and anticipated facts that can be
reviewed after execution without the benefit of hindsight. As long
as the neutral and detached magistrate can conclude that there is
probable cause to search based on those historical and anticipated
facts, then individual rights are protected from discretionary gov-
ernmental intrusions.
On the societal or governmental side of the balance, there is
significant value in retrieving or discovering seizable evidence to-
gether with gathering evidence of receipt, possession, and knowl-
edge of offenses whose discovery is otherwise difficult to collect.
Judicial refusal to validate anticipatory searches will virtually elim-
inate the investigative tactic of controlled or observed deliveries
unless exigent circumstance entries are permitted. Yet, police reli-
ance on exigent circumstances to justify entry demes citizens a
neutral and detached review of at least the information available
to police prior to the anticipated delivery Either consequence
appears to be too great a cost to society in comparison to benefits
received.
Since most federal courts now hold that anticipatory warrants
are constitutional, the overarching concern is the exercise of officer
discretion in executing the warrant. 35 Magistrates should carefully
craft warrant guidelines to limit officer discretion. Conditions should
be "explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunder-
standing or manipulation by government agents."' 3 6 One method
of controlling police discretion is to provide that any deviation
from the listed delivery circumstances requires notification to the
issuing magistrate before the warrant is executed. The magistrate
should be the neutral and detached party evaluating the probable
cause impact of the changed circumstances. For example, even
apparently minor changes m the delivery process may have a major
impact on evaluating the reliability of the source of the delivery
information and thus the probable cause determination.
But, a telephone call or in-person attempt to explain the changed
circumstances to the magistrate will undoubtedly delay an intru-
sion, with concomitant risk of loss of the evidence. The risk of
lost evidence may be viewed as a basis for an exigent circumstance
intrusion buttressed by the original anticipatory warrant. In that
"I See United States v. Moore, 742 F Supp. 727, 734 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
116. United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1989).
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situation, the risk of loss analysis may follow two scenarios: the
executing officer may believe that there is no time to contact the
magistrate about changed circumstances; or, the officer may at-
tempt to reach the magistrate but be unable to do so within the
time necessary to ensure recovery of the evidence. To avoid giving
complete discretion to the officer on the issue of exigent circum-
stances, the basis for the decision to proceed with the search or,
where appropriate, the objective quality of the effort to reach the
magistrate should be weighed against realistic and objective con-
cerns of loss of evidence. The objective risk of loss should not be
merely the concern that occurs whenever evidence is believed to be
in a defendant's possession. Rather, the risk should be objectively
demonstrable under the specific circumstances.1 7 Where the risk is
objectively demonstrated, even though a condition of the warrant
may not have been met, much of the information in the warrant
has been presented to and considered by a magistrate and suggests
at least potential probable cause to officers who now also reason-
ably believe that exigent circumstances exist.
Also, because of potential abuse of officer discretion in deter-
numng when to execute the warrant, the objectively reasonable
standard should be utilized when police assert either that the deliv-
ery met the clear, concise, and narrowly drawn conditions prereq-
uisite to execution, or that exigent circumstances required munediate
entry Good faith should not be a permitted test for the execution
decision by police officers. 3 '
The courts also should carefully examine the potential scope
of the warrant to determine if it is a pretext for a search the police
cannot otherwise conduct. Magistrates should not rely on a delivery
alone to assume that there is other seizable evidence on the prem-
ises; there should be careful assessment of all the information,
13 For example, if the delivered items were drugs, then pedestrian traffic in and out
of the premises could be an objective circumstance increasing the risk of loss of the evidence.
See supra note 59.
3I Moore, 742 F Supp. at 738-39. In Moore, if clear conditions had been given, the
police would not have been able to demonstrate objectively that the anticipated event
occurred. As noted by that court, the good faith exception does not protect the officers'
decision to search because a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
basis for the magistrate's authorization to search had not occurred. See State v. Wright,
772 P.2d 250 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989). The warrant authorization to search was conditional
on a future event, but no conditions were written into the authorization. Since police never
observed any events suggesting delivery, the court's three opimons should not have permitted




including the delivery, to justify a search for items that could be
found anywhere on the premises. 13 9 The magistrate also should
make a specific determination whether there is probable cause to
search independent of the anticipated delivery Such a determna-
tion focuses the officer's and magistrate's attentions on the precise
scope of the search and its independent justifications. It further
limits police discretion when the officer assesses whether there is
judicial authority to search even though delivery conditions have
not been met.'14
A final issue is specificity of the place of the search. If the
bases for execution are specifically limited and the scope of the
search is limited to the container to be delivered, there may be
circumstances where a court could permit a search of an unspecified
but described location. When faced with a delivery process in which
the suspect is observed picking up a container of narcotics, but
police are unaware of its ultimate destination, the interest in prov-
ing possession with knowledge of the contents will be effectively
achieved only by following the package to a resting place where
the suspect's retention of the container demonstrates such knowl-
edge. Refusal to issue warrants in such circumstances again requires
police to forgo such observed deliveries as an investigative tech-
nique. Presumably, police reliance on exigent circumstances to
choose a place to search as the final destination of the container
again places individual privacy in the hands of police discretion.
If both forms of search are denied to police, drug traffickers win
easily avoid evidence of possession with knowledge by having other
persons pick up the container.
One possible solution to that problem is to place specific lim-
itations in the warrant, allowing a search of only the first place
that police observe the defendant enter carrying the container in
which the defendant and the container remain for a specified period
of time.141 Entry is clearly justified to recover the contraband and
M3' United States v. Weber, 915 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1990) (The court found insufficient
information to support a search beyond retrieval of a delivered package.).
110 In Moore, 742 F Supp. at 727, the court divided the warrant into anticipatory and
non-anticipatory parts. The court found insufficient probable cause to execute either aspect
of the warrant, but also found that the good faith exception applied to the non-anticipatory
aspect of the warrant. If the issuing magistrate had more carefully evaluated the independent
aspects of the search, there would have been no intrusion, and the reviewing court would
not have had to resort to a good faith analysis to justify the intrusion.
14, An example could be the delivery in United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653 (9th
Cir. 1984). Although the container was addressed to defendant's residence, once the defen-
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may, but certainly is not guaranteed to, provide evidence of defen-
dant's knowing possession of the contraband. The limitations also
would deny police the unfettered discretion to decide which prem-
ises to search as "the final resting place" of the container even if
they search only one premses. 42
The suggested limitations will require more care in drafting
affidavits and warrants than is currently evident in many of the
cases and is perhaps more than can be expected in many quickly
unfolding drug investigations. 143 Some requirements, however, al-
ready are demanded by the courts. Those, together with additional
requirements, may be an impetus to more widespread prosecutor
involvement in drafting affidavits and warrants. 44 Detailed limi-
tations and enhanced prosecutor involvement should provide more
reasonable bases for intrusions on individual privacy interests,
without sacrificing legitimate societal attempts to investigate and
prosecute crimnal offenses.
dant picked up the container at the airport there was no probability that the container,
when it reached defendant's residence, would still contain the contraband. Perhaps a
limitation that police could search the first premises into which defendant took the container
and remained for a specified penod of time, permitting opemng of the container, would be
sufficiently specific.
1,2 State v. Moms, 668 P.2d 857, 862 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
"3 Time pressure is a factor one court was willing to consider when facing a good
faith issue. See Weber, 915 F.2d at 1282.
I" See id.
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